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ABSTRACT 
Federal and state law prohibit government officials from accepting gifts or “emoluments” from 
outside sources.  The purpose of gift bans, like restrictions on more explicit forms of bribery, is to 
protect the integrity of political processes and to ensure that decisions about public policy are 
made in the public interest—not to advance a private agenda.  Similar considerations animate 
regulations on campaign funding and lobbying.  Yet private entities remain free to offer gifts to 
government itself, to foot the bill for particular public projects they would like to see government 
pursue.  Such gifts—dubbed “patriotic philanthropy” by one prominent donor—raise fundamental 
questions about the private role in public policymaking, questions that are central to debates over 
campaign finance, private philanthropy, and the privatization of government functions.  
Nevertheless, they have received virtually no attention in the legal literature.  This Article offers a 
positive and normative account of gifts to government.  Although we do not question the enormous 
good that patriotic philanthropy can do, we argue that gifts raise significant concerns about 
democratic process, equality, and state capacity.   
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 18, 2015, the public radio program Radiolab aired a segment called “Eye in the Sky,” 
which focused on a new brand of surveillance that relies on a single plane-mounted camera array 
to watch an entire city, for as long as the plane is in the air.1  The technology was developed during 
the Iraq war by an Air Force engineer named Ross McNutt, to help the military figure out who 
was planting roadside bombs.2  The idea was tantalizingly simple, as was the pitch: “Imagine 
Google Earth with TiVo capacity.”3  In short, the cameras would serve as an eye in the sky that 
never blinked, and that recorded everything it saw.  Because the cameras captured such a wide 
area, the images were tiny; pedestrians, for example, would appear as mere dots.  But the point 
was tracking, not recognition.  Using the recorded images, analysts could work backward from an 
event—such as a roadside explosion—to pinpoint any vehicle that stopped at the target location, 
and then trace the movements of that vehicle to identify any addresses it visited before and after 
the explosion.   
After retiring from the military in 2007, McNutt began to focus on commercial applications 
for the technology.  He started a company called Persistent Surveillance and started attending 
                                                     
1 http://www.radiolab.org/story/eye-sky/ 




security trade expos to market his product.4  His first client was the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, 
Mexico, which—thanks to warring drug cartels—had earned the title of most dangerous city on 
earth.  The technology was a great success, helping the city secure dozens of arrests and 
confessions in a few months’ time.  Soon, however, the mayor ran out of money to pay for the 
service, and McNutt returned to the United States and the search for clients.5  
As it happened, the Radiolab program proved to be providential.  Shortly after the “Eye in the 
Sky” segment aired, McNutt received an email from Texas billionaires John and Laura Arnold.  
John had been a trader at Enron and later ran a successful hedge fund; the Arnolds now manage 
an eponymous foundation with $1.8 billion in assets.6  The Arnolds told McNutt that if he could 
find a U.S. city willing to try out the surveillance technology for several months, they would pick 
up the tab.  “We settled on Baltimore,” McNutt later told reporters, “because it was ready, it was 
willing, and it was just post-Freddy Gray.”7   
Starting sometime in 2016, McNutt began conducting aerial surveillance for the Baltimore 
Police Department.  Persistent Surveillance’s plane circled high above the city for as many as ten 
hours a day, capturing and storing images that the police used to investigate all manner of crimes.8  
True to their word, the Arnolds donated $360,000 of their own money to foot the bill.9  Had 
taxpayer dollars been involved, the transaction would have required approval by the city’s five-
member Board of Estimates.10  The private funding arrangement allowed McNutt and the police 
department to forego the formal approval process, and the program remained a secret until it was 
exposed in a Bloomberg article in August of 2016.11   
The Arnolds’ gift to Baltimore is but one example of a growing phenomenon that features 
wealthy benefactors donating money to government to support particular policies and projects.  
This Article explores such “patriotic philanthropy,”12 situating it at the intersection of private 
philanthropy, political participation, and the privatization of government.  Each of these subjects 
concerns the private role in public policy, and each has spawned a vast literature (much of it 
critical).  To date, however, most of the relevant commentary has proceeded on separate tracks.  
Attention to gifts helps illuminate the connections that run from one area to the next, offering a 
                                                     
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Doug Donovan, Billionaire donors Laura and John Arnold support far more in Maryland than police surveillance, 
BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 26, 2016). 
7 Reel, supra note 2. 
8 Id. 
9 Scott Calvert, Crime-Fighting Planes in Baltimore Funded by Houston Philanthropists, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Aug. 
25, 2016). 
10 Justin Fenton & Doug Donovan, Use of Local Foundation Allowed Baltimore Police Surveillance Project to Remain 
Secret, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 24, 2016). 
11 Reel, supra note 2.  As it turns out, McNutt also convinced the city of Compton, California to use his surveillance 
technology.  See Connor Friedersdorf, Eyes over Compton: How Police Spied on a Whole City, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 
21, 2014).  
12 E.g., Sophie Gilbert, David Rubenstein’s Patriotic Philanthropy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2014). 
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glimpse at the larger system of private influence over governance.  
Consider, first, the connections between philanthropy and political participation.  The 
literature on philanthropy rarely engages with the equally vast literature on campaign finance and 
lobbying, though the two forms of influence raise similar concerns about equality and fidelity to 
democratic norms.  Philanthropy, critics worry, enables wealthy individuals and foundations to 
decide for themselves what is good for others, without the sort of democratic checks—and 
accountability—that apply to government actors.13  As one critic writes, “[d]on’t like what the 
Gates Foundation did with its $3.4 billion in 2011 grants ($9.3 million each day of the year), or 
what it has done with $25 billion in grants since its inception in 1994?  Tough, there’s no way to 
vote out the Gateses.”14  Similarly, critics of prevailing campaign-finance law argue that wealthy 
donors are able to exert outsize influence over electoral results, and ultimately over public policy.15  
Both lines of critique emphasize anxieties about creeping plutocracy—about a shift from 
collective, democratic modes of decisionmaking to policymaking dominated by the moneyed few.   
Gifts to government, we argue, raise these concerns in particularly stark form.16  At first blush, 
such gifts may seem to avoid the pitfalls of private philanthropy.  Rather than going outside of 
government, patriotic philanthropy brings new resources into the public sector, with all its checks 
and balances.  The difficulty is that government may be all too eager to accept the deal.  To be 
sure, a public entity like the City of Baltimore has no shortage of alternative revenue sources.  
Governments can borrow; they can charge fees; and they can tax.  Yet, from the government’s 
perspective, each of those funding alternatives has significant political and practical downsides.17  
Gifts avoid those problems, offering an immediate and seemingly costless source of funds.  As a 
result, offers like the Arnolds’ may be difficult for the government to refuse.  Much like looking a 
gift horse in the mouth, second-guessing generous endowments, or quibbling about their terms, 
will often seem like bad manners at best and “political malpractice” at worst.18   
Gifts, therefore, are likely to exert a gravitational force on public policy, pulling government 
officials into projects they would not otherwise pursue.  That form of influence—powered by 
money—is analogous to, but likely stronger than, the influence of campaign contributions, 
                                                     
13 See infra Part II.B. 
14 Rob Reich, What are Foundations For?, BOSTON REVIEW (March 1, 2013).  Some of those critiques focus on the 
favorable tax treatment of charitable donations, which amounts to a government subsidy for donors’ chosen projects 
and “functions as an increasingly greater subsidy and incentive with every higher step in the income tax bracket.”  
Rob Reich, Philanthropy and its Uneasy Relation to Equality, in BEYOND GOOD INTENTIONS: LEARNING TO DO GOOD, 
NOT HARM, IN PHILANTHROPY 13 (William Damon & Susan Verducci eds., 2006). The same tax deduction applies to 
gifts to government.  See I.R.C. § 170(3)(c)(1) (2012) (providing that gifts to state and federal government are tax 
deductible, so long as they are made for “exclusively public purposes”). 
15 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2012); 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
16 Gifts to government institutions must be distinguished from gifts to government employees or officials, which are 
prohibited.  See, e.g., Richard Rifkin, Gift Giving in the Public Sector, in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
249, 249–55 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2008). 
17 See infra Part I. 
18 David Morton, Miss Manor, CITY PAPER (Feb. 13, 2014). 
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expenditures, and lobbying.  Like the government’s alternative funding sources, those traditional 
avenues of political influence have considerable shortcomings.19  Voters, campaign supporters, 
and lobbyists cannot control government officials.  If they do, they will enter the forbidden territory 
of bribery, extortion, and what the Supreme Court has called “quid pro quo corruption.”20  
Campaign expenditures and lobbying are widely permitted precisely because they operate as 
nudges (perhaps quite vigorous nudges, but nudges nonetheless) rather than commands.  From the 
perspective of individuals like the Arnolds, then, those options may seem unsatisfactory: They 
might induce the relevant officials to experiment with new investigative technology, but they 
might not.  Again, gifts avoid those problems.  A gift does not simply generate gratitude and 
indebtedness on the part of the recipient.21  When targeted at a particular policy initiative, a gift is 
explicitly a quid pro quo: I will donate this money if you do this thing.  Such influence is powerful 
indeed, and it runs counter to our democratic commitment to collective, deliberative 
decisionmaking.    
Gifts also raise a second set of concerns that lacks an analogue in the debates on campaign 
finance, but that will be familiar to students of privatization.22  Although gifts and other forms of 
private financing expand the reach of the state in the short term, in the longer term they may have 
a hollowing effect. Gifts allow government to accomplish goals it cannot actually afford.  That 
consequence may seem good or bad, depending on one’s views about the optimal size and scope 
of government.  The key point for our purposes is that private money papers over the government’s 
weaknesses.  Combine private financing with more conventional forms of privatization—whereby 
government enlists private actors to perform tasks previously performed by government 
employees—and we create the potential for a balloon state: a public sector seemingly vast in reach, 
but in fact remarkably thin.23  
To highlight these concerns is not to deny the manifold benefits of patriotic philanthropy, nor 
to impugn the intentions of those who give their money to government.  Indeed, we focus on gifts 
in part because they seem so desirable.  Gifts like the Arnolds are hardly the only means by which 
private actors finance the modern state.  In so-called public-private partnerships, for example, 
private investors finance government projects in the expectation of healthy financial returns, either 
via interest payments from the government or revenue from public facilities such as parking meters 
or toll roads.  As critics have recognized, such arrangements raise serious concerns about the 
mismatch between the private profit motive and the public interest.24 
                                                     
19 See infra Part II.A. 
20 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). 
21 For seminal work on the power of gifts, see MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN 
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (1954 American Edition). 
22 For more on privatization, see infra Part I.E. 
23 Cf. Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 4-5 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) 
(identifying “diminished government capacity” as one of the “most prevalent and provocative objections” to 
privatization). 
24 See infra Part I.E. 
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Patriotic philanthropy seems to avoid the profit-motive pitfall, which may explain why it has 
attracted virtually no critical attention.25  We seek to show, however, that private financing of 
government ought to be cause for concern even where it is unselfish—where well-meaning citizens 
are contributing their fortunes to support a vision of the public good—and where the immediate 
consequences seem, at worst, innocuous.  If our analysis is correct, it suggests the need for far 
more attention to the role of private money in government more generally.  Perhaps private 
financing is indispensable; perhaps modern government cannot survive without it.  But if that’s 
the case, We the People should make sure we appreciate the terms of today’s new deal. 
The argument unfolds in three parts. Parts I and II explain the incentives behind gifts to 
government.  Part I canvasses the options available to government officials looking to raise money, 
and the limitations of each alternative.  Part II shifts to the private perspective to show why patriotic 
philanthropy may be attractive to individuals and entities seeking to influence public policy.  We 
develop our critique of gifts in Part III.  
I. MONEY FOR GOVERNMENT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOURCES OF FINANCING 
Crumbling roads, sagging overpasses, derelict school buildings.  Across the United States, 
aging infrastructure has become a particularly visible illustration of the fiscal challenges of modern 
government.  Still reeling from the recession of 2007-2009, state and local governments lack the 
funds to make needed repairs and upgrades.26  The problem is not limited to infrastructure, of 
course, but extends to the various services governments supply—or would supply, if they could 
afford to.  While revenues dropped during the recession, needs went up: With more people living 
below the poverty line, demands for public services have increased, as have public safety costs.27  
But, rather than ramping up services, states and local governments have had to make painful cuts, 
targeting everything from police to fire and sanitation to public schools and libraries.28   
Nor is the problem confined to states and municipalities.  At the federal level, soaring deficits 
have brought terms like “the fiscal cliff” into everyday lingo.29  And, though infrastructure 
improvement was a major plank in President Trump’s campaign platform, federal lawmakers have 
not exactly jumped at the chance to pass a major spending bill.30  Nevertheless, financing woes are 
                                                     
25 The exception here is private funding for public education, which has provoked debate in both popular and academic 
presses—though most of it has been focused on the substance of philanthropic interventions (particularly by the Gates 
Foundation) rather than the fact of private financing as such.  See infra Part II.C.   
26 Ellen Dannin, Crumbling Infrastructure, Crumbling Democracy: Infrastructure Privatization Contracts and Their 
Effects on State and Local Governance, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 47, 50 (2011). 
27 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE LOCAL SQUEEZE 14-16 (June 2012). 
28 Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1160-67 (2014) (describing recent budget 
cuts). 
29 Jackie Calmes, Demystifying the Fiscal Impasse that is Vexing Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012) (explaining 
the “fiscal cliff”). 
30 Editorial, Missing: Donald Trump’s Trillion Dollar Infrastructure Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017) (noting that 
congressional leaders “seem decidedly unenthusiastic about the idea of a huge infrastructure spending proposal”). 
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significantly more pressing at the state and local levels, where balanced-budget requirements and 
restrictions on allowable debt and taxes constrain governments’ ability to raise needed funds.31   
This Part explores the various funding options available to government officials.  The goal is 
not to catalogue every possible source of money for government, but to sketch some of the 
alternatives.  Tracing out these alternatives reveals a funnel-like shape, with some options drawing 
money from a broad range of sources and others tapping into a narrower band of financiers.  The 
discussion here follows the contours of the funnel, proceeding in rough order from more collective 
to more individualized—or more public to more private—means of financing the state.   
A. Taxes 
The most obvious source of funding for government programs and services is general tax 
revenue.  Taxes provide the bedrock for most public financing.  They may take various forms, and 
different tax-types are more common at different levels of government.  The federal government 
today relies heavily on income taxes; state governments use a mix of sales, excise, and income 
taxes; and local governments derive most of their revenue from property taxes.32   
What unites these diverse instruments is their generality.  Tax revenues are drawn from a 
broad base of payers, and they are typically deposited in a general fund from which sums may be 
appropriated to support various government initiatives.  Taxes apply to everyone within the 
authority of the relevant governmental unit, regardless of whether each taxpayer will take 
advantage of particular government services.33  We pay property taxes even if our children do not 
attend local public schools; we pay federal income taxes even if we oppose, or derive no benefit 
from, the programs they fund.34    
In these ways, taxes collectivize the support of government programs, spreading the costs 
across the citizenry.35  To the extent that individuals can control the amount or use of their tax 
payments, they do so not as consumers—making self-interested determinations about what 
services they want and how much they are willing to pay—but by voting as citizens.  As such, 
broad-based taxes both reflect and reinforce a form of “fiscal citizenship,” which one performs 
“by contributing one’s appropriate share—however modest—toward the financing of the political 
community of which one is a member,” and then “by becoming informed about government taxing 
and spending policies, and by becoming involved (at least as a voter, and perhaps more deeply) in 
the determination of those policies.”36  
                                                     
31 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text; see also David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 2544, 2555 (2004) (emphasizing state budgets’ sensitivity to business cycles). 
32 RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 649 (7th ed. 2009). 
33 DAVID J. MCCARTHY, JR. & LAURIE REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 382 (2003) (“Taxes are imposed 
without consideration of whether the individual taxpayer will benefit from the services to be funded by the tax.”). 
34 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“‘Compelled support of government’—even those 
programs of government one does not approve—is of course perfectly constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest.”). 
35 MCCARTHY & REYNOLDS, supra note 33. 
36 LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 
17 (2013). 
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The broad reach of taxes can be an advantage to government fund-raisers, as it reduces the 
financial hit per person.  But taxes also have important limitations.  Even modest tax hikes can be 
extraordinarily unpopular, and therefore difficult to enact as a political matter.  The political 
hurdles are made higher still by state constitutional provisions requiring voter approval and/or 
legislative supermajorities for tax increases at both the state and local levels.37  Many states also 
impose substantive caps on the permissible level of taxation.38  
As a practical matter, moreover, a modest tax hike will be little use for capital projects and 
other initiatives that call for large sums of money up front.  For example, New York officials 
recently announced an ambitious redevelopment plan for LaGuardia Airport—with an anticipated 
price tag of approximately $4 billion.39  To finance such a project out of general funds, the state 
and/or local government would have to raise taxes sharply in the short term, slash funding for other 
programs and projects, or both.40  Even if those approaches were politically feasible, it may seem 
unfair to make today’s citizens bear the entire burden of a project that will benefit residents for 
decades to come.   
B. Inter-Governmental Grants 
Governments also can share revenue with each other via inter-governmental grants, such as 
federal grants to the states or state grants to localities.41  Grants may be particularly attractive 
funding options from the perspective of the recipient government, because they sometimes 
masquerade to voters as free money.  Grants are not actually free, of course:  State citizens are also 
federal taxpayers, and as such they contribute to any grants to their own states, as well as to federal 
largesse bestowed on other states.  But that reality may be easy for voters to ignore, creating what 
economists call a “fiscal illusion” that can cause state (or local) voters to support a higher level of 
spending—and taxes—than they otherwise would.42   
Despite their immediate appeal, grants can have significant downsides for recipients.  To the 
extent that voters do realize that they are paying for federal grants, they may have less tolerance 
for state or local taxes.43  And many grants require the recipient to contribute matching funds, 
                                                     
37 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 700 (“The constitutions of sixteen states now require a legislative 
supermajority (ranging from 60% to 75%) to approve some or all new taxes or tax increases, and eight states (including 
seven with legislative supermajority requirements) require voter approval for some or all new or increased state 
taxes.”). 
38 Id. at 699-701. 
39 Andrew Tangel, Team Selected for La Guardia Redevelopment, WALL ST. JOURNAL (May 28, 2015). 
40 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 791 (“New capital infrastructure can be very costly.  It might not be 
possible to finance a big project out of ordinary tax revenues without either a massive tax increase or severe cuts in 
expenditures for ordinary and necessary services.”). 
41 In 2014, the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available, intergovernmental revenues accounted 
for approximately $550 billion in state revenues, out of a total of about 2.3 trillion.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE 
GOVERNMENT FINANCES: 2014. 
42 Philip J. Grossman, The Impact of Federal and State Grants on Local Spending: A Test of the Fiscal Illusion 
Hypothesis 18 PUB. FINANCE QUARTERLY 313 (1988). 
43 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2622 & n.13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When a heavy federal 
tax is levied to support a federal program that offers large grants to the States, States may, as a practical matter, be 
unable to refuse to participate in the federal program and to substitute a state alternative. . . . [H]eavy federal taxation 
 9 
drawing in state or local revenues to support another sovereign’s priorities.44  Worse still, grants 
can be undependable, leaving recipients holding the bag when the outside money runs out, unable 
to terminate programs that have cultivated dependent constituencies.45   
Perhaps most importantly, grants tend to come with strings attached.46  In order to get money 
for highways, for example, states may have to accede to federal policy demands, such as requiring 
motorcyclists to wear helmets47 or raising the legal drinking age to twenty-one.48  In addition to 
the short-term hit to policy autonomy, inter-governmental grants might also have more subtle costs 
to state independence—costs that today’s state officials and citizens may fail to internalize fully.49  
For these reasons, some federalism scholars would outlaw or restrict federal-state grants.50   
C. Fees 
As an alternative or supplement to taxes and inter-governmental grants, government could 
require citizens who use government services to pay for them directly, via user fees and the like.  
For example, rather than (or in addition to) financing a public museum with tax dollars, 
                                                     
diminishes the practical ability for States to collect their own taxes.”).  For a critique of this line of reasoning, see 
Brian Galle, Does Federal Spending ‘Coerce’ States? Evidence from State Budgets, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 989 (2013). 
44 See, e.g., Super, supra note 31, at 2586 (“The largest federal-state cooperative funding program, Medicaid, in theory 
requires states to supply about forty-three percent of total program funding.  Other important programs, from cash 
welfare and child care subsidies to transportation, require state or local matches as well.”).  Even when grants are not 
matching grants, they may effectively skew state or local priorities by virtue of the so-called “flypaper effect.”  James 
R. Hines, Jr. & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 217 (Autumn 1995). 
Simply put, grant recipients are unlikely to compensate for the influx of money by moving their own funds to other 
projects; instead, money tends to “stick where it hits.”  Id. at 218; see E.M. Gramlich, Intergovernmental Grants: A 
Review of the Empirical Literature, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 219-39 (W.E. Oates, ed. 
1977).  Thus, studies show that “[g]rants designated for, say, public schooling, were largely spent on (extra) public 
schooling even when the grants were clearly inframarginal.” G. Brennan & J.J. Pincus, A minimalist model of federal 
grants and flypaper effects, 66 J. PUBLIC ECON. 229, 230 (1996).  
45 Super, supra note 31, at 2591 (“Because of the share of states’ budgets that the federal government provides, the 
periodic efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit have profound impacts upon states.”); Brian Galle, Federal Grants, 
State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 893 (2008) (noting that “over time, a constituency might develop that depends 
on the grant revenues and form a powerful lobbying coalition to retain them”). 
46 Galle, supra note 45, at 882 (“When Congress distributes money to other persons or entities, it typically does so 
subject to conditions.”). 
47 Highway Safety Act of 1966,  Pub. L. No. 89-564,  80 Stat. 731 (1966); 23 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1969). 
48 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal spending program that directs the Secretary of 
Transportation to withhold a percentage of otherwise allocable federal highway funds from States "in which the 
purchase or public possession . . . of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is 
lawful." (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 ed., Supp. III)). 
49 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1936-39 (1995); 
Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 
124. 
50 E.g., Baker, supra note 49, at 1988-89. 
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governments could charge museum-goers an admission fee.51  Such voluntary user fees are 
common at all levels of government.52 
Voluntary user fees are different from taxes in both form and concept.  Unlike taxes, user fees 
cast citizens and governments into the roles of consumers and sellers.53  Fees and similar devices 
“depend crucially on the relationship between the payer and the purpose for which the revenue 
raised will be spent.”54  Individuals pay only for the services they use.  In theory, at least, such fees 
match benefits to burdens, ensuring that those who enjoy the fruits of government services also 
bear the costs.55  And, like private-sector pricing mechanisms, user fees can promote efficiency by 
generating useful signals about the value of government-supplied goods and services.  If users 
aren’t willing to pay the full cost of a service—so the theory goes—then perhaps the government 
should scale back or eliminate the service entirely.56  In this sense, user fees can be understood as 
part of broader trends toward privatization,57 or “running government like a business.”58   
From the perspective of government revenue-raisers, user fees are a mixed bag.  On the plus 
side, fees change the payment base, imposing the cost of government services on those who take 
advantage of them, even if they are not local residents.  Better yet, fees and the like are typically 
                                                     
51 For a description of various kinds of governmental fees and charges, see BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, 
at 725-26. 
52 See Peter A. Pfohl, Who Should Pay for Agency Adjudication? A Study of $200,000 Filing Fees at the Surface 
Transportation Board, 25 TRANSP. L.J. 57, 71 (1997) (“Almost two hundred billion in user fees is collected annually 
by [federal] agencies.”); Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay for” Model 
of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 376 (2004) (describing “how special assessments, fees, and the formation 
of business improvement districts have overtaken general taxation as the preeminent revenue raising device” in local 
government). 
53 Reynolds, supra note 52, at 376-77 (criticizing user fees and similar funding mechanisms that link public benefits 
to private payments and so “exacerbate[] and cement[] [a] dues mentality in the minds of the citizenry”); see also 
GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 705 (6th ed. 2015) (“In California, where fees have played a large 
role for years, an increased reliance on fees has generated a fee-for-service mentality, and it, in turn, has transformed 
what a city government is—what it provides, and whom it exists to serve.  In the place of a general service government 
providing public goods to all residents, local governments increasingly function as a retailer of services purchased and 
consumed by individual users.”).   
54 MCCARTHY & REYNOLDS, supra note 33, at 382-83.  A close cousin to the user fee is the special assessment, which 
“require[s] landowners who have receive a special benefit from a local government expenditure to reimburse the local 
government.”  BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 716.  Common examples are street paving and curb-
installation.  Id. at 717.  Like user fees, “[s]pecial assessments convert government from a social and political 
community into a kind of business, more responsive to major customers than to a broader community.” Super, supra 
note __, at 2619. 
55 Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 
795, 814 (1987) (noting that user fees can “lessen burdens that otherwise would be borne by taxpayers who derive 
little or no benefit from the service”). 
56 Milton Kafoglis, User Fees as a Regulatory Tool, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: 
FEDERAL USER FEES, PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM 13, 17 (Thomas D. Hopkins ed., 1988) (arguing that user fees 
“generate incentives on the part of payees to monitor the efficiency of the operation of agencies”) [hereafter ACUS 
SYMPOSIUM]. 
57 Thomas Gale Moore, User Fees and Privatization, in ACUS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 56, at 7 (“[U]ser fees facilitate 
privatization, which I believe is generally a good idea.”). 
58 Jon Michaels, Running Government Like a Business…Then and Now, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1152 (2015). 
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exempt from the substantive and procedural limitations that apply to state and local taxes.59  But 
fewer payers also means less money, or means that each user has to pay an exorbitant fee.   
A more fundamental limitation on voluntary user fees is that they will not work for every kind 
of project.  They will not be much help for projects, like the LaGuardia redevelopment described 
above, that need substantial up-front financing.  Nor will fees work well for projects that generate 
diffuse benefits, extending to the general public and not just those individuals who directly use the 
services in question.60  Suppose, for example, that a municipality charges residents a fee for each 
garbage pick-up; it’s up to residents to decide how often to schedule pick-ups and pay the fee.  
Frequent garbage collection benefits users individually, but it also benefits the neighborhood 
collectively—or at least those neighbors who care about cleanliness. Residents are unlikely to take 
account of such third-party effects when deciding how often to use (and pay for) the service.  The 
probable consequence of user fees, then, is that citizens will underuse valuable services.61 
D. Bonds 
For governments in need of ready money, borrowing offers an attractive alternative to taxes 
and fees.  Governments at all levels of the U.S. borrow billions of dollars each year, typically by 
issuing bonds that can be purchased by individuals and institutions worldwide.62  State and federal 
law encourage bond ownership by making interest tax-exempt.  Sometimes the inducements are 
more personal, appealing to citizens’ sense of shared responsibility for public welfare.  During 
WWII, for example, the government used patriotic inducements to advertise war bonds, describing 
the bonds as “a chance to buy our boys back.”63 
Borrowing offers some obvious advantages over more incremental, or coercive, forms of 
financing.  Just as the average family uses a mortgage to finance the purchase of a new home, 
governments often use bonds to generate the money needed for large projects and programs.64  In 
addition to producing a more immediate payday, borrowing avoids the problems of inter-temporal 
equity that afflict both taxes and user fees: Rather than forcing current citizens to bear the full cost 
of long-term improvements, it spreads the cost of government programs over many years and many 
                                                     
59 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 726. 
60 Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 55, at 808 (cautioning against user fees for services that have the qualities of public 
goods). 
61 Id. at 809.  In areas ill-suited to voluntary fees, involuntary fees may still be an option for government. For example, 
some cities charge all arrestees a fee.  Chapter One Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1727–28 (2015).  
Others charge defendants for the costs of prosecution and/or incarceration.  Speeding tickets and other fines can also 
be understood as part of this revenue-raising strategy, as can forfeitures.  Whereas voluntary user fees attach a price 
to the benefits citizens derive from various government services, involuntary fees seek to recover the costs that citizens 
impose on government. Involuntary fees are controversial for various reasons, including the incentives they create for 
law enforcement, and for targeting those least able to pay.  See id. 
62 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32 789-90 (“State and local governments borrow literally billions of dollars 
every year. . . . Indeed, bonds finance roughly two-thirds of the capital expenditures of state and local governments.”). 
63 James T. Sparrow, “Buying Our Boys Back”: The Mass Foundations of Fiscal Citizenship in World War II, 20 J. 
POL’Y HISTORY 263, 263 (2008). 
64 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 790 (“[B]onds finance roughly two-thirds of the capital expenditures of 
state and local governments.”). 
 12 
taxpayers.65  Because a bond issue draws funds from willing creditors, borrowing also allows 
government to avoid the political pitfalls of a hike in taxes or fees.   
But if the appeal of borrowing is clear, so too are the risks.  Like families, governments may 
borrow too much, taking on obligations they can’t fulfill.  That possibility is hardly hypothetical.  
The financial crises of the mid-1800s—when several states were thrust into insolvency by an 
economic downturn that came on the heels of massive borrowing to finance canals, railroads, and 
turnpikes66—are being repeated in today’s municipal bankruptcies.67  
Even if governments are able to keep up with payments, the lure of ready cash may create a 
moral hazard, inducing officials to undertake projects that are not cost-justified.  After all, 
borrowing allows today’s government to take credit for valuable initiatives while leaving 
tomorrow’s citizens (and their representatives) to deal with onerous interest payments.  And when 
hard choices must be made about how to allocate limited funds, extensive debt raises 
uncomfortable questions about where government’s loyalties lie: with citizens, or with creditors? 
These risks have led most states to adopt strict limitations on allowable debt.  As with 
restrictions on taxes, debt limitations may be substantive or procedural.  Substantive limitations 
impose caps on debt; procedural rules require government to clear special democratic hurdles—
such as voter approval, approval by a legislative supermajority, or both—before taking on new 
debt.68   
Such barriers to debt are important, but they tend to be flimsier than they appear on first 
inspection.  Most limitations apply only to “general obligation” debt—that is, bonds that are 
serviced from the general treasury and backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing 
government.  So-called “revenue bonds”—which are backed only by specified revenue sources—
typically are exempt.69  The same is true of bonds that are issued by entities other than the state or 
municipal governments themselves, including so-called “public authorities.” (Indeed, that is one 
of the reasons why governments create such entities in the first place.70)   
What this means in practice is that governments can often work around debt limitations.  As 
always, though, there are tradeoffs.  Loans that are not guaranteed by the full faith and credit of 
                                                     
65 See Dept of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008) (“Bonds place the cost of a project on the 
citizens who benefit from it over the years . . . and they allow for public work beyond what current revenues can 
support.”). 
66 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 639-40; see also ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA, DEBT WISH: 
ENTREPRENEURIAL CITIES, U.S. FEDERALISM, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1996). 
67 When the City of Detroit filed for bankruptcy in July of 2013, it was the twenty-eighth city to declare municipal 
bankruptcy or to enter a receivership since the economic recession of 2008.  Anderson, supra note __, at 1120. 
68 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 790. 
69 Id. at 792 (noting that nonguaranteed debt via revenue bonds “has become the principal form of state and local 
borrowing in recent decades”). 
70 See JONATHAN RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM __ (2005) 
(noting the “proliferation of state and municipal bodies that have been created solely to issue debt in efforts to 
circumvent balanced budget requirements”); see also BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 872-73 (discussing 
public authorities). 
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the state tend to be riskier for creditors, and therefore significantly more expensive than 
conventional general-obligation bonds.71  Paradoxically, then, the primary effect of legal debt 
limitations may not be to limit borrowing so much as to raise its cost.72   
E. Public-Private Partnerships 
An additional possibility—becoming more common in recent years—is to solicit help from 
the private sector by forming what is known as a “public-private partnership,” or P3.73  For 
example, the LaGuardia Airport redevelopment project described above has been called “the 
country’s largest . . . public-private partnership.”74  Roughly half the funding for the $4 billion 
project will come from a private consortium (made up of several investment banks and funds, 
together with an airport management group and construction and design joint ventures), which will 
“be responsible for designing, building, financing, operating, and maintaining the new [LaGuardia] 
terminal as part of a 35-year lease.”75   
Public-private partnerships tend to take one of two forms.  In the first type, known as a 
“demand-risk” P3, a private developer fronts the money for a government project in exchange for 
the right to collect user fees that would otherwise have gone to the government.  Demand-risk P3s 
bear some resemblance to revenue bonds, in that they rely on revenue from the projects in 
question—tolls for a new highway, for example—to pay for improvements.  As the name suggests, 
however, a public-private partnership transfers more responsibility to private-sector “partners,” 
who may be responsible for construction, maintenance, and/or operations as well as financing.76 
The second type of partnership is known as an availability-payment P3.  Under the availability 
model, the government commits to paying the private partner(s) a set amount contingent on the 
project’s meeting certain quality benchmarks.  Initial financing may come in whole or in part from 
the private entity, often derived from bonds that the government issues on the private entity’s 
behalf.  The private entity then handles the work, while the government makes regular payments 
to cover operating and maintenance costs and to service any debt.77  The contingent nature of the 
                                                     
71 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 792. 
72 State governments are well aware of this dynamic, and “the need to keep debt burdens under control to keep 
borrowing costs down is an important part of the political discourse in the states.”  RODDEN, supra note 70, at 133. 
73 Ryan Holeywell, The Indiana Toll Road: A Model for Privatization?, GOVERNING MAGAZINE (Oct. 2011) 
(“[G]overnments’ desire for P3s is on the rise.  With state and federal highway budgets stretched, lawmakers are 
reluctant to supplement them with higher gas taxes or general fund revenue.  That makes P3s an attractive option, and 
in some circles they have been portrayed as a miracle cure for the country’s crumbling infrastructure.”). 
74 Andrew Tangel, Team Announced For LaGuardia Redevelopment, WALL ST. JOURNAL (May 8, 2015).  
75 Press Release, Governor Cuomo Unveils Vision for Transformative Redesign of La Guardia Airport (July 27, 2015), 
available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-unveils-vision-transformative-redesign-laguardia-
airport. 
76 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: GLOBAL P3 LANDSCAPE (Sept. 8, 2014) 
(describing demand-risk P3s). 
77 Id. (describing availability-payment P3s). 
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government’s obligation takes the arrangement outside the reach of state-law limitations on 
allowable debt:  In the argot of public finance, a contingent obligation does not count as “debt.”78 
In part because P3s are relatively new, the terms of the relevant contracts are highly variable.  
As compared to conventional forms of borrowing, therefore, P3s leave more room for the 
government and the private sector to jostle for advantage—mutual or otherwise.  For government, 
the trick is to make P3s attractive to private investment without giving away the store.79  Chicago’s 
parking meter lease illustrates the challenge.  Facing a budget crisis in late 2008, then-Mayor 
Richard M. Daley agreed to lease the city’s parking meters to a private company for 75 years.  In 
exchange, the company paid the City roughly $1.2 billion.80  The City’s website trumpeted the 
lease and other similar deals as “prudent[]” and “responsib[le]” investments that would 
“eliminate[] long-term risks of increased operating and capital expenditures, while mitigating the 
risk of future changes in driver behaviors.”81  But things didn’t go quite as expected for the City.  
The private company raised parking rates, prompting a cascade of citizen complaints.  Not long 
after, the city’s inspector general concluded that the City had vastly undersold the lease—by at 
least $1 billion.82  
Chicago’s experience now stands as a cautionary tale,83 and has fueled a movement away from 
the demand-risk model and toward availability-payment P3s.84  But even availability-payment 
arrangements involve a delicate balance of risk and reward.  Such arrangements place the risk of 
cost-overruns on the private sector, while allowing the government to reap any profits that follow 
from higher-than-expected revenue streams.  But if revenues are lower than expected—if, for 
example, decreased driving means that fewer individuals are paying for parking—the government 
will be left holding the bag.   
P3s also trigger an additional set of concerns, familiar to debates about privatization more 
generally. Most privatization in the U.S. takes the form of contracting-out: The government enlists 
private entities to perform tasks—building roads, collecting trash, running prisons, etc.—that 
previously had been performed by government employees.85 Advocates of privatization argue that 
                                                     
78 BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 32, at 836. 
79 See Paul Landow & Carol Ebdon, Public-Private Partnerships, Public Authorities, and Democratic Governance, 
35 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 727, 729 (2012) (“Studies have shown that governments often end up bearing 
most of the risk [in P3s], despite appearances to the contrary, as private firms find ways to protect themselves.”) 
80 Hillary Russ, States and Cities are Increasingly Turning to Private Money To Fund Public Projects, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2014). 
81 http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/fin/supp_info/public_private_partnerships.html 
82 Russ, supra note 80. 
83 Id. (citing Chicago’s parking meter lease as the “most-often-told cautionary tale” about the first generation of P3s 
in the U.S.). 
84 See MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, CERTAIN US P3 OBLIGATIONS WILL BE TREATED AS GOVERNMENT DEBT (Feb. 
2, 2015) (describing trend toward availability-payment P3s). 
85 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2003) (describing the prevalent 
model of privatization in the United States as “government use of private entities to implement government programs 
or to provide services to others on government’s behalf”).  For a small taste of the vast literature on privatization, see 
JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS (1989); GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT, supra note 23; PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT 
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market discipline can make private-sector providers more efficient than government.86  For critics, 
the differences between market and government cut the other way.  Detractors worry that 
privatization will disserve the public interest by substituting profit-seeking private entities for 
public servants—making profit, rather than public welfare, the driving force behind public 
policy.87  
P3s represent yet another step down the road to privatization, combining private performance 
with private financing.  As such, they magnify concerns about profit motivation.  Consider again 
the Chicago parking meter lease.  Hiking up parking rates is good for the bottom line; not so good, 
perhaps, for public welfare.  The quest for profits also may skew which projects get funded in the 
first place, as governments intent on finding partnership opportunities may tend to focus on areas 
that are capable of generating revenue for their would-be corporate backers.88 
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, P3s are on the rise in the U.S.  Thirty-three states and the 
District of Columbia now have legislation that enables P3s—up from 23 in 2006.89   Meanwhile, 
government officials of various stripes are singing the praises of P3s.  For example, private 
investment is central to President Trump’s ambitious plan to revitalize the country’s infrastructure, 
with proposals ranging from $500 million to $1 trillion.90  Chicago’s current mayor, Rahm 
Emanuel, has embraced P3s (even as he seeks to distance himself from the notorious parking meter 
                                                     
FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2007); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in 
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023 
(2013); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003).  
86 See Michaels, supra note 85, at 1034 (“Rank-and-file government workers are viewed [by privatization’s 
proponents] as receiving higher base pay and more generous benefits than their private sector counterparts.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
87 See Freeman & Minow, supra note 23, at 4–5 (summarizing the major critiques of privatization). 
88 Christopher Weber, The Problem with Public-Private Partnerships, NextCity.org (May 7, 2012) 
(https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/the-problem-with-public-private-partnerships) (criticizing P3s for “let[ting] corporate 
interests drive public investments”).  A related investment tool, still in its infancy in the U.S., is the social impact bond 
(SIB)—also known as “pay for success” or “social innovation bonds.”  SIBs ameliorate some of the concerns about 
subject-matter skew associated with P3s, because they tend to focus on public policies that lack any clear profit 
component.  They work as follows: “Money from private donors and philanthropic dollars are invested upfront to help 
get the program off the ground. If the program meets the predetermined requirements over a specified time, the money 
is returned [by the government, with interest].”  Bill Bradley, Social Impact Bonds: Beneficial or Bureaucracy-
Bloating?, NEXT CITY (May 8, 2014), available at https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/senate-hearing-social-impact-
bonds-helpful-harmful; see also Matthew Bishop & Michael Green, Philanthrocapitalism Rising, 52 SOCIETY 541, 
542 (2015) (“This is a way to transfer the risk of innovative public policy initiatives to the private sector, tapping non-
profit operational expertise and for profit risk appetite.”); Social Finance, How Pay For Success Works, available at 
http://socialfinance.org/how-pay-for-success-works/ (describing how SIBs are funded).  SIBs have been used in the 
United States to develop programs designed at reducing recidivism, improving early-childhood education, and 
facilitating reentry by formerly incarcerated citizens.  Bradley, supra. 
89 Kevin Pula, Public-Private Partnerships for Transportation: Categorization and Analysis of State Statutes, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2016), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/transportation/P3_State_Statutes.pdf. 
90 Melanie Zanona, Trump’s Infrastructure Plan: What We Know, THE HILL (Jan. 13, 2017), available at 
http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/314095-trumps-infrastructure-plan-what-we-know (“[E]ven if the package 
requires the government to chip in some public funding for infrastructure, Trump is almost certain to rely heavily on 
private financing—especially since that funding mechanism is far more likely to garner the support of Capitol Hill 
Republicans.”). 
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lease).91  “We have great corporations in Chicago who are, in my view, the best of corporate 
citizens,” Emanuel said recently. “I couldn’t achieve anything I’m trying to do without their 
participation.”92  Mayor Alvin Brown of Jacksonville was even more explicit: “[P3s] are the wave 
of the future.  Government can’t do it alone.”93   
*   *   * 
As this discussion suggests, governments have various options for financing programs and 
services.  Each funding alternative raises a different set of tradeoffs, and the source of funding has 
important consequences both for government behavior and for the relationship between 
government and citizens.  As we move from more collective to more individualized sources of 
financing, moreover, a common theme emerges: a recurring concern about the possible gulf 
between private incentives and the public interest.  Funding strategies that rely on individuals and 
entities to buy into government programs raise the possibility that public services will be biased in 
favor of citizens with the most spending power, and toward initiatives with the most concentrated 
benefits.  Programs that have the characteristics of public goods may be underfunded as a result. 
Against this backdrop, the appeal of an outright gift should be obvious.  From the 
government’s perspective, patriotic philanthropy must rate somewhere just below manna from 
heaven.  Not only do gifts avoid many of the difficult legal and logistical tradeoffs sketched above, 
but they also seem to rest on public-spirited altruism rather than the selfish pursuit of individual 
benefits.  What’s not to like? 
In Part III below, we will argue that gifts are not as costless as they first appear.  First, though, 
we need to confront a seeming puzzle.  For all Americans grouse about taxes, it may be difficult 
to imagine citizens voluntarily handing over their hard-earned cash to public officials.  It’s easy to 
understand why governments would welcome gifts, but why would anyone want to donate money 
to government?  The next Part takes up that question, shifting from the governmental to the private 
perspective, and from the challenge of raising money to the challenge of deploying it effectively.  
II.  MONEY AS INFLUENCE: SPENDING OPTIONS FOR POLICY ENTREPRENEURS 
A. Campaign Spending and Lobbying 
Suppose you would like to see your government (federal, state, or local) adopt a particular 
public policy.  For example, maybe you are unhappy with the fact that your city does not have 
enough bike lanes, or you want more sidewalks, or you believe the police should be using aerial 
                                                     
91 John Schwartz, $7 Billion Public-Private Plan in Chicago Aims to Fix Transit, Schools, and Parks, N.Y. TIMES 
(March 29, 2012). 
92 Weber, supra note 88. 
93 Id.; see also Carol Ebdon & Paul Landow, The Balancing Act: Using Private Money for Public Projects, PUBLIC 
BUDGETING & FINANCE 59 (Spring 2012) (noting that “[t]he estimated investment needs [for infrastructure] over the 
next five years are $2.2 trillion, which is beyond the collective ability of government to fund”); Stacia A. Wells & 
Robert M. Siegel, Fixing US Infrastructure: New Model P3 Law A Good Start, LAW 360 (Jan. 27, 2016) (“[T]he 
United States is facing an infrastructure crisis and our needs are far greater than the government can provide on its 
own.  Private capital and innovation are available to help.”).   
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surveillance to better combat crime.  How can you convince public officials to adopt your policy 
of choice? 
If you are a person of modest means, you will discover quite early on that your options are 
limited. You can, of course, find a candidate or politician who shares your views, and you can vote 
for that person. Even that will not always be easy—the more idiosyncratic your aims, the more 
quixotic your quest for a suitable candidate will be.  But even if you can find the right candidate, 
simply voting for her will be insufficient:  You have to convince others to vote for your candidate 
as well.  Although voting is an individual right, it is also a collective endeavor.94  And, like all 
collective endeavors, there are costs to collective action.95 You will need to identify like-minded 
others and convince them to support your candidate. 
If you can spare the time—a limited resource—you can certainly volunteer for your 
candidate’s campaign.  If you have the money, you can also make a small contribution to your 
would-be champion.  Here, though, you will run into the same collective action problem you 
encountered with voting.  Your contribution will not be enough to make a dent on its own; it must 
be pooled with contributions from like-minded others.  This is particularly so in a world in which 
most polities have enacted limits on how much a single individual or organization can contribute 
to a political candidate.96 Even in the absence of contribution limits, only a very small handful of 
individuals are capable of funding a candidate or campaign by themselves.  For a person of limited 
means, supporting your candidate includes convincing your fellow citizens to contribute as well.   
The need for collective action persists even if you are able to surmount these challenges and 
elect or reelect your preferred candidate.  Few, if any, legislators are positioned to affect change 
unilaterally.  Thus, it is not sufficient to elect a champion: You will need to convince other 
lawmakers and other institutions (your political party, for example) to support your cause.  To get 
the attention and support of those other actors, you will likely need to contribute to them as well.  
This requires even more money and perhaps more time.  And still, there are no guarantees.  Even 
if you can persuade a group of lawmakers to support your cause, the project may run into 
insurmountable roadblocks.  To name just a few possibilities, your preferred public policy 
objective may not be politically palatable; the government may not have the money to fund it; 
there may be competing priorities; or your lawmakers may be more responsive to the preferences 
of someone else, perhaps a major contributor, than they are in responding to you.97 
As a person of modest means, therefore, your options of effecting change are more or less 
limited to voting, volunteering your time to persuade others to your cause, and perhaps a small 
                                                     
94 Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001). 
95 See, e.g., Jon Elster, Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action, 96 ETHICS, 136, 139 (1985). 
96 David Primo and Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States, 5 ELEC. 
L.J. 23, 29 (2006) (noting that “most states have some restrictions on contributions”). 
97 Jack Citrin, Do People Want Something for Nothing: Public Opinion on Taxes and Government Spending, 32 NAT. 
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contribution to your preferred candidate.  For the vast majority of Americans, this is the extent of 
their political participation.98 
Suppose now that you are rich—very very rich.99  You have four mutually inclusive options 
available to you. You can make political contributions to your favorite candidates; you can spend 
money to promote the candidates or policy outcomes that you prefer; you can bribe public officials 
to enact your public policy preferences; and you can lobby public officials to enact your policy 
preferences.100  Each option has different agency and collective-action costs, as we describe below.  
If your goal as a wealthy policy entrepreneur is to purchase public policy outcomes, political 
participation proves to be relatively inefficient.101  
As before, your first option is to identify a politician who will support your cause, and support 
her candidacy.  Unlike your less affluent counterpart, however, you have vast resources to offer.  
As a result, candidates and politicians will be much more likely to come to you and will be much 
more likely to bend their will to yours.102  They will gladly solicit and accept your contributions. 
You might contribute directly to a candidate’s political committee or PAC; you might start a 
PAC yourself.  But you will soon find yourself dissatisfied with simply handing over your money 
in this way.  There is a passivity associated with making a contribution that is inconsistent with 
the agency and control you might expect to exercise as a consequential political agent.  Once you 
turn over the money to the candidate, you have very little control over how the candidate will use 
it.  There is no effective mechanism to “earmark” your political contribution.  Thus, in making a 
contribution, you subordinate your views on how to spend the money, or the content of the political 
message, or even how best to achieve an ostensibly shared purpose, to the recipient of the 
contribution.   
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options.  We think that this is a mistake.  If we leave aside the expressive dimension of each option, the reason for 
their exercise is instrumental—the funder is interested in policy change.   A funder interested in policy change has to 
decide how to allocate her funds among those four options.  Each option is conducive to policy change, but at different 
costs.  See e.g., Matthew D. Hill et. al., Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying, 42 FIN. MGMT. 931 (2013); 
Bard Harstard and Jakob Svensson, Bribes, Lobbying, and Development, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 46 (2011). 
101 This inefficiency, we will suggest, is baked into our democratic system.  That is, representative democracy is a 
collective enterprise, and collective-action and agency costs are compelled by the nature of the enterprise.  We will 
return to this point in Part III, where we argue that we ought to be suspicious of any scheme that attempts to eliminate 
those costs.  The goal of the present discussion is simply to highlight the limitations of conventional means of financial 
influence. 
102 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 15. 
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We can frame this issue with political contributions as a principal-agent problem.103 
Ordinarily we might think of the contributor as the principal and the recipient candidate as the 
agent. On this account, the contributor-principal makes the contribution to the recipient-agent 
pursuant to an objective defined and directed by the principal-contributor.  In reality, however, it 
is often the recipient of the contribution that directs and defines the objective.  As contributor, 
more often than not, you are confirming your assent to a predefined goal; by contributing, you are 
simply indicating a willingness to help the recipient achieve that goal.104  
Making matters worse, the politician-agent is faced with a conflict of interest that runs counter 
to your preferences as the contributor-principal.  The candidate’s preference for being elected or 
reelected uber alles conflicts with your specific preferences of the principal-contributor.  Where 
those interests coincide, the agent is likely to carry out your wishes, but only as a matter of 
incidental interest convergence.  
The principal-agent problem is not limited to campaigns but persists at the level of 
governance. Assuming that your candidate in fact gets elected, you will prefer that she spends as 
much time as possible on promoting your preferred policy.  But there are significant monitoring 
costs here as well.  You cannot control how your agent spends her time and you have no effective 
mechanism to account for the time spent on your issue.  Because of the information asymmetry 
between you and your agent, you are vulnerable to “cheap talk” and subject to your agent’s ever-
present potential conflict of interest—which is to do, say, or prioritize anything that will get her 
reelected.   
In short, political contributions are subject to significant agency costs, and often are 
suboptimal where the contributor’s goal is to achieve a specified predetermined end.105  If you 
want to maintain your agency as a policy entrepreneur, the better approach is to make independent 
expenditures. Independent expenditures minimize the type of monitoring costs associated with 
political contributions and enable the principal to advocate directly—though not always 
explicitly—in support of the politicians or public policy outcomes that she favors.106   
                                                     
103 For a similar analysis, see Daryl Levinson, Market Failures and Failures of Markets, 85 VA. L. REV. 1745 (1999). 
104 The Supreme Court has recognized this voluntary loss of agency in its campaign finance cases. For example, in 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court stated that contributions do not express the contributor’s own views 
but the views of the recipient.  424 U.S. at 21 (“While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a 
candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate 
involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”)  At most, the contributor is expressing support for or 
associating herself with the speech or views of the political candidate, who is effectively the principal.  Id. at 22 
(“Making a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.”).   
105 Of course, not all contributors are interested in defining their public policy ends.  Many contributors do not have 
the knowledge, or resources such as time, or perhaps even the interest to specify particular ends. Thus, they are more 
than willing to join the recipient of the contribution to accomplish ends specified by the end user. However, 
sophisticated political actors often desire to define and control their public policy objectives.  For such actors, political 
contributions are second-best solutions, though sometimes necessary alternatives.  For research consonant with this 
view see Sanford C. Gordon, Catherine Hafer, and Dimitri Landa, Consumption or Investment? On Motivations for 
Political Giving, 69 J. POL. 1057 (2007). 
106 An independent expenditure is an expenditure for a communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat 
of a clearly identified candidate and is not made in coordination with or at the request the candidate or a candidate’s 
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At the federal level, there are a number of vehicles that you can use for independent 
expenditures.  You can create a 501(c)(4),107 a 501(c)(3), or a 527 organization108 to support your 
favorite candidate and your issue.  Each entity has its own benefits and drawbacks.  But each entity 
will allow you to support candidates and causes of your choosing.   
In addition to these entities, you can create an expenditure-only PAC, more popularly known 
as a super PAC. A super PAC is simply a political committee that can raise and spend an unlimited 
amount of money, as long as it does not make any direct contributions to political candidates.  A 
super PAC will allow you to spend however much money you want to advocate in favor—again 
not always explicitly—of your preferred public policy solution as well as your favorite politicians 
or political candidates. 
As attractive as these options may at first appear, you will in short order find yourself 
frustrated with independent expenditures as your primary vehicle for effecting change. 
Independent expenditures undoubtedly facilitate your ability to advocate for your favorite public 
policies, but they do not actually change public policy. Advocacy is not implementation.  And, to 
the extent that policy implementation is a desired goal,109 advocacy does not and cannot avoid the 
costs of collective action. 
Perhaps the most significant problem with independent expenditures, however, is that—by 
definition and design—such expenditures attempt to create a barrier between the individuals who 
are advocating for a particular political outcome and the individuals who are capable of 
implementing that outcome.  To qualify as independent, an expenditure cannot be directed by, 
controlled by, or coordinated with a candidate. Thus, where the purpose of an expenditure is to 
encourage legislative action, independent expenditures are suboptimal because the money is not 
going to the individuals—the politicians—who are most capable of implementing political change. 
How can you, as wealthy policy entrepreneur, get your money directly to lawmakers (or at 
least close to them), without relinquishing all control?  You might try to minimize the agency costs 
by offering certain politicians an extra incentive to devote the resources and the time to working 
                                                     
authorized committee. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006); 11 CFR 100.16(a).  Additionally, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme 
Court stated that an independent expenditure can only be regulated when it uses “express words of advocacy.”  424 
U.S. 44 n.52.  Examples of express advocacy are words such as “vote for” or “vote against”; “elect” or “defeat”; 
“support or oppose”. 
107 A 501c(4) entity is a social welfare organization that is primarily engaged in social welfare activity.  A 501(c)(4) 
organization can engage in political activity as long as the political activity is not the organization’s primary activity. 
A 501c4 organization may not make a direct political contribution to a federal candidate, federal PAC, or political 
party.  A 501c4 may make contributions to an expenditures-only PAC.  See generally, Gregg D. Polsky and Guy-Uriel 
E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000 (2005). 
108 A 527 group is a type of political organization, such as parties, candidates, committees, that is organized for the 
primary purpose of influencing elections.  The organization is so-called because the tax status of this type of an 
organization is governed by section 27 of the tax code.  A 527 organization is not subject to federal contribution limits.  
But it is subject to disclosure requirements of both contributions and expenditures.  Provided that an organization is 
registered with the IRS under section 527, it is exempt from federal income taxes.  For a full treatment of the subject 
see Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on Section 527 Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773 (2007).   
109 See, e.g., Hall and Reynolds, Targeted Issue Advertising and Legislative Strategy: The Inside Ends of Outside 
Lobbying, 74 J. POL. 888 (2012) (finding that purpose of independent expenditures is to mobilize legislative allies). 
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on the issues that you have identified as your priorities.  In particular, you might offer a bribe as a 
way of reducing the agency costs associated with contributions, and exerting some control over 
politicians’ behavior.  That is what we do in many other contexts, after all: We purchase the 
services of our agents and we sometimes offer to pay them a bonus for effort or results that go 
above and beyond an agreed baseline.   
Alas, this exercise of control over public officials is expressly prohibited by bribery laws, 
which forbid a citizen from purchasing personal political representation in the same way that one 
would purchase other kinds of services.110  The fact that the principal has made a contribution does 
not entitle her to complete control.  On the contrary, by making bribery illegal, our law arguably 
requires agency costs. The state has a monopoly on the lawmaking function that it guards 
jealously, and that function cannot be bought or sold.  One justification for bribery laws is precisely 
to protect this monopoly on lawmaking.111  
Additionally, because bribery is illegal, enforcing the bargain is also a problem. Consequently, 
bribery is likely a negative-sum game: You may not get the public policy outcome that you are 
seeking because of the difficulty of enforcing the bargain and everyone involved is likely to end 
up in jail.   
This brings us to your final option: lobbying.112  As one scholar put it, lobbying “is the natural 
means of seeking political influence.”113  Theoretically, lobbying is a mechanism with fewer 
agency costs as compared to campaign contributions and independent expenditures.114  Because 
lobbying puts the lobbyist in close proximity to the lawmaker, it creates better opportunities to 
monitor public officials and influence their preferences.  Some scholars have argued that lobbying 
is the best legal means available for persuading legislators and government officials on policy 
issues.115  
The literature on lobbying generally identifies two methods of persuasion. Lobbyists can 
educate lawmakers by providing information that may not be available to them.116  Additionally, 
or in the alternative, lobbyists can make political contributions to lawmakers, which can serve to 
                                                     
110 On anti-bribery laws, see Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the Outside 
Income of Government Officials, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 71-80 (1992); Nicholas Jarcho & Neal Shechter, Public 
Corruption, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107 (2012). 
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of the public servant’s decisionmaking process, so that decisions are made to advance the public interest and not the 
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114 For an analysis of how contributors address those agency costs see James Snyder, Long-Term Investing in 
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115 See e.g., JOHN MARK HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS: CONGRESS AND THE FARM LOBBY 1919-1981 (1991). 
116 See, e.g., Brian Kelleher Richter et. al., Lobbying and Taxes, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 893, 895 (2009). 
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persuade lawmakers to support their policy preferences, reward those that do, and implicitly 
threaten those that don’t.117 
Lobbying does not simply entail persuasion and access. It might involve a special kind of 
access, the opportunity to be directly involved in lawmaking. Few, if any, major pieces of 
legislation get passed without the involvement of lobbyists, who are sometimes directly involved 
in drafting legislation. This further reduces monitoring costs by reducing the need to rely on the 
agent, the government official, to enforce implicit or explicit bargains.  All of this helps explain 
why lobbying, for good or ill, has long been regarded as a strategic and indispensable strategy for 
influencing policy. 
But lobbying, like independent expenditures and contributions, is also suboptimal.118 
Lobbying is very costly. At least one study has concluded that interest groups spend far less on 
lobbying when it takes the form of making political contributions to lawmakers than when it takes 
the form of attempting to influence policymaking by providing information to political officials.119 
Additionally, the returns on investment are uncertain.120  This is because lobbying on one side of 
an issue is often accompanied by counter-lobbying on the other side.121  Lobbying also suffers 
from significant agency costs,122 and lawmakers are sometimes constrained by electoral 
considerations, partisanship, ideology, and other limitations.  The lobbying literature, although 
vast and robust, is still trying to figure out precisely what interest groups get out of lobbying.123  
In sum, if you are a wealthy policy entrepreneur looking to purchase a public policy outcome, 
your traditional political process options are rather inefficient.  Political contributions to public 
officials raise agency costs and collective-action problems.  Independent expenditures and 
advocacy are inefficient because the funds are not going to the individuals—the lawmakers—who 
are best positioned to implement the policy change.  Collective-action problems persist here too, 
because you will need to convince a large group of people to agree to the public policies you prefer.  
Bribery is an option but it may be the least attractive one:  It is illegal and is subject to holdup 
problems.  Lobbying seems to be the most promising path.  It might reduce collective-action 
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subsidy. 
118 See, e.g., Marcel Fafchamps, Alain de Janvery, and Elisabeth Sadoulet, Social Heterogeneity and Wasteful 
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39 POLITY 29 (2007). 
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problems by identifying the key decisionmakers and vetogates, incentivizing them to act in your 
favor, and providing you an opportunity to influence lawmaking directly.  Lobbying also reduces 
agency costs by enabling you to monitor the lawmaker; through proximity, it might reduce the 
information asymmetry between you as principal and politicians as agents.  But lobbying is very 
costly and the benefits are speculative.  It is not clear that lobbying buys policy.  
All of this helps explain why a rational wealthy policy entrepreneur interested in purchasing 
policy outcomes might attempt to develop options other than the traditional ones provided by 
democratic politics. The remainder of this Part considers two such options: traditional private 
philanthropy, and “patriotic” philanthropy directed at government.  
B. Private Philanthropy 
Critics of big government and taxes sometimes suggest that we should “cut out the 
middleman.”124  Rather than paying taxes to government and then relying on government to select 
and provide beneficial services, why not keep all that money in the private and philanthropic 
sectors and focus on private solutions?  This vision suggests an alternate set of strategies available 
to our wealthy policy entrepreneur.  Instead of (or in addition to) straining to influence government 
behavior, she can simply pursue her chosen initiatives herself through private investments and 
philanthropy.125   
The philanthropic approach holds the potential of erasing the agency costs associated with the 
political strategies discussed above.  Private giving today buzzes with terms like “strategic 
giving,”126 “venture philanthropy,”127 and “philanthrocapitalism.”128  The idea is straightforward: 
Instead of simply handing over their money to other organizations (nonprofits, typically) and 
hoping for the best, donors increasingly are focusing on ways to maximize the impact of their gifts.  
Strategies include insisting on performance benchmarks and other ways of measuring 
                                                     
124 ZELENAK, supra note 36, at 36. 
125 Bishop & Green, supra note 88, at 542 (“[A]s the 21st century unfolds it has become accepted, and even expected, 
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126 PETER FRUMKIN, STRATEGIC GIVING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PHILANTHROPY (2006). 
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effectiveness, “making fewer, larger grants to smaller circles of organizations,”129 and developing 
and running initiatives themselves rather than funding unsolicited proposals from nonprofits.130  
The upshot is that contemporary philanthropy tends more toward top-down policymaking—with 
philanthropists and foundations setting priorities and managing performance—and away from 
passive support for bottom-up efforts by nonprofits and the communities they serve.131  
Philanthropy today is not only more “strategic” than it once was; it is booming.  Americans 
donated $373.25 billion in 2015—the highest total ever.132  As one insider put it, we are in the 
midst of a “period of tremendous growth in the philanthropic sector—particularly the rise of a 
mega-foundation like Gates, which can by itself steer policy on education reform or global 
health.”133  Soaring gifts amounts are underwritten, in part, by the growing concentration of wealth 
at the top of the economic ladder.134  According to Forbes Magazine, the number of billionaires 
worldwide more than quadrupled between 2000 and 2015.135  The new-billionaire club includes a 
cohort of relatively young donors, flush from hedge-fund and Silicon Valley profits, who are 
committed to giving away most of their fortunes during their lifetimes.136  That commitment is 
reflected in the Giving Pledge, a promise “by the world’s wealthiest individuals and families to 
dedicate the majority of their wealth to philanthropy.”137  The Giving Pledge has attracted 157 
signatories since its inception in 2010, all of them “billionaires or those who would be billionaires 
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but for their giving.”138   
For all the good it does, philanthropy has its critics.  Critiques tend to focus on three themes.  
One has to do with the favorable tax treatment of charitable donations, which amounts to a 
government subsidy for donors’ chosen projects.  Some critics argue that current tax law reflects 
a “plutocratic bias,” because “the favored beneficiaries of the wealthy receive the lion’s share of 
the subsidy.”139  Others emphasize that the charitable deduction “is a form of privatization.  Money 
that would otherwise be available for tax revenue that could be democratically directed is shielded 
from public control for private use.”140  
A second and related set of critiques focuses on concerns about transparency and 
accountability.  Philanthropy, so the argument goes, can have profound consequences for many 
people—and yet those people have no means of influencing (much less controlling) the behavior 
of the philanthropists.  As one skeptic put it, “[o]ur functioning democracy, as imperfect as it is, 
holds to the ideal that all people should have an equal voice.  Philanthrocapitalism is based on a 
rather flat assumption that what matters are results rather than process.”141  The Gates Foundation 
is often used to illustrate the point.  The Foundation made $36.7 billion in grants between 2007 
and 2015; it has a current endowment of $39.6 billion.  Those funds reflect the combined donations 
of the Foundation’s three trustees: Bill and Melinda Gates, and Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren 
Buffett.  For detractors, the small number of trustees and the enormous sums of money they control 
trigger something of a “who died and made you king?” reaction.142    
Third, critics worry that “philanthropy, by channeling private funds towards public services, 
erodes support for government spending on health and education.”143  The idea here is that, to the 
extent that private giving can fill in gaps in the government’s own provision of services, citizens 
become less willing to contribute tax dollars toward initiatives that primarily benefit others.  For 
example, public support for welfare programs might turn, in part, on the existence of a private 
safety net for low-income or unemployed citizens.  If so, one might worry about what happens if 
the private money suddenly runs out; or one might ask, “[i]s this the kind of public good that we, 
as democratic citizens, have the right to offload to a private entity, however reliable and 
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For those who harbor anxieties about private philanthropy, gifts to government may offer 
some reprieve.  Although gifts to government qualify for the same tax deduction as gifts to private 
charitable causes, it’s hard to muster much of an argument against government subsidizing itself.  
And, if one is concerned about accountability, transparency, and abdication of government’s 
obligations, so-called patriotic philanthropy may well look like a cure-all.    
Importantly for present purposes, gifts to government also are likely to appeal to would-be 
philanthropists themselves.  If the goal is changing public policy, it will sometimes be necessary 
to team up with government.  Even when government participation is not strictly necessary, the 
government is a uniquely powerful partner.  Suppose, for example, that you want to make a 
donation to help low-income families in New York with back-to-school costs.  You could certainly 
collaborate with a local nonprofit to try to publicize and distribute the available funds.   But 
working directly with state government offers significant advantages.  Among other things, the 
state already has in place a system for distributing public-assistance and food-stamp benefits, and 
your donation can simply be added to the funds already available through the state.145   
This example is not a hypothetical; it describes a $35 million gift from George Soros to the 
State of New York—a gift that then-Governor Paterson described as “an example of how the public 
and private sectors can work together to foster a brighter future for the low-income families of our 
state.”146  Nor, as the next section shows, is the back-to-school example sui generis.  In the 
discussion that follows, we offer a descriptive account of gifts to government.  In Part III, we turn 
to normative analysis. 
C. Gifts to Government 
Gifts to government come in various shapes and sizes.  Some may be solicited by government 
actors.147  Others, such as the Arnolds’ gift to the Baltimore Police Department, are made at the 
initiative of the donor.  Some are open-ended, to be used by the recipient however it sees fit.148  
Others, like Soros’ and the Arnolds’, are earmarked for specific purposes.   
While giving to government is not new,149 there is reason to think that the phenomenon is on 
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the rise.150 At the very least, complementary trends in the philanthropic and public sectors have 
created an atmosphere conducive to patriotic philanthropy.  As the previous section explained, 
philanthropy is becoming more top-heavy and donor-driven, with mega-rich “policy plutocrats” 
“directing not only their money but also their time, ideas, and political leverage toward influencing 
public policy.”151  Meanwhile, governments are increasingly embracing privatization and public-
private partnerships to address the growing strain on public capacity—the felt reality that 
“government can’t do it alone.”152  Although the story of privatization tends to focus on harnessing 
the private profit motive to finance and deliver public services, partnering with government 
promises benefits beyond profit.  In Mike Bloomberg’s words,  
[i]n so many areas, governments represent our best hope for making the broad-
based societal changes that philanthropic organizations are devoted to bringing 
about. Governments have the authority to drive change in ways that philanthropic 
organizations cannot. By leveraging our resources, and forming partnerships with 
government, philanthropic organizations can help push those changes forward.153   
It should come as no surprise, then, that philanthropy has a significant role to play in today’s 
blending of public and private.  Indeed, “arguably the clearest indicator of how 
philanthrocapitalism has moved into the mainstream is the way that governments are starting to 
engage with these new actors in solving society’s toughest problems.”154  
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The available data, while limited, are consistent with an upward trend in gifts to government.  
The U.S. Census Bureau collects annual data from state governments on state revenue from various 
sources, including gifts from private sources.  That category is limited to gifts of cash or securities 
from private individuals or corporations; it does not include “noncash gifts and donations, such as 
food, property, buildings, land, commodities, etc.”155  Figure 1 shows nationwide totals from 1992 
to 2014 (excepting 2012, for which data are not available): the grey line represents total private 
donations in current-year dollars; the black line shows inflation-adjusted totals, reflecting each 
year’s gifts in 2014 dollars.   
 
 Source: U.S. Census Bureau Annual Survey of State Government Finances, 
https://www.census.gov/govs/state/  
 
It is difficult to develop a comprehensive sense of the substance of patriotic philanthropy, but 
gifts appear to cluster around certain types of initiatives.  Public facilities, for example, are 
recurring subjects of gifts.  In recent years, private donations have helped finance community 
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and—in the case of donations for higher education—the recipient institutions.  Telephone interview with Steven 































Figure 1: Total State Revenues From Private Donations
Donations in 2014 dollars Total Donations
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centers,156 libraries,157 convention centers,158 sports arenas,159 and more.  Outdoor public spaces—
parks,160 nature conservancies,161 etc.—likewise have drawn substantial gifts from the private 
sector.  One researcher reports that “roughly half of all state parks across the United States now 
have an associated nonprofit ‘Friends of the Parks’ group.”162  The equivalent at the federal level 
is the National Park Foundation, which supports the National Park Service through private gifts.  
The Foundation reported $73.5 million in gifts in 2015—up from $16.5 million in 2011, the earliest 
year for which aggregate data are reported.163    
Relatedly, private gifts frequently support public exhibitions, both inside museums and 
outside in the form of monuments.  For example, several years ago David Rubenstein, a private 
equity financier who is responsible for coining the term “patriotic philanthropy,”164 donated $7.5 
million to the national Park Service to cover the cost of sealing a crack in the Washington 
Monument.165  Rubenstein has made other donations to the Park Service, including $18.5 million 
to restore the Lincoln Memorial and $12.35 million to repair the Robert E. Lee memorial in the 
Arlington Cemetery.166  He also paid $21.3 million for a copy of the Magna Carta, which is on 
display in the National Archives in a new Rubenstein-funded $13.5-million gallery.167 
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162 Gazley, supra note 150. 
163 NATIONAL PARK FOUNDATION, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, available at 
https://prod.nationalparks.org/sites/default/files/Annual_Report_FY15.pdf. 
164 Alec MacGillis, The Billionaires’ Loophole, NEW YORKER (March 14, 2016). 
165 National Park Service, David Rubenstein Donates Funds to Modernize Washington Monument Elevator (Dec. 2, 
2016). 
166 Id. (listing Rubenstein’s gifts that have made “him a leader in the incredible legacy of private support for national 
parks”). 
167 MacGillis, supra note 164. 
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Detroit’s “Grand Bargain” represents a similar dynamic on a much larger scale.  In 2014, as 
the city teetered on the brink of insolvency, a group of nine foundations put together an ambitious 
plan to save the Detroit Institute for the Arts, which was at risk of seeing its renowned collection 
auctioned off to help cover the city’s almost $18 billion in debts, including a $3.5 billion shortfall 
in money needed to cover pension obligations to city retirees.  In exchange for about $800 
million—including $330 million from the foundations, as well as contributions from other private 
donors and the State of Michigan—the city agreed to transfer ownership of the Institute to a 
nonprofit, and to put the money into the retiree pension system.168   
Public schools also continue to be common—and controversial—targets of philanthropic 
giving.  Public education was one of the earliest social services offered widely by government,169 
and one of the few public services that state governments are constitutionally obligated to 
provide.170  Private dollars have been part of the public-education equation from the outset, 
particularly in the South, where Reconstruction governments struggled to fund their newly created 
state-supported school systems.171 Today, in addition to booster clubs and fundraising parent-
teacher organizations, many school districts have their own “local education foundations” devoted 
to raising and distributing private contributions for public schools.172  In 2010, school-supporting 
charities reported more than $880 million in revenues.173  
It bears emphasis that gifts to public schools do not merely seek to support schools as they 
are, but to change them.174  As Rob Reich has explained, “[v]ery frequently these donations are 
earmarked for particular activities—for extracurricular materials, for additional schools supplies, 
for field trips—giving the donors a nontrivial amount of input or leverage on how the school or 
district operates.”175  Some gifts are earmarked for specific kinds of instruction.  For example, 
BB&T’s “Moral Foundations of Capitalism” program—which has made grants ranging from 
$150,000 to $5 million to more than 60 colleges and universities—includes required readings in 
                                                     
168 See, e.g., Randy Kennedy et al., Foundations Aim to Save Pensions in Detroit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014); 
Randy Kennedy, ‘Grand Bargain’ Saves the Detroit Institute of Arts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014). 
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 31 
Ayn Rand.176  Although neither BB&T nor its charitable foundations has identified the 
participating schools, research suggests that recipients include a host of public universities.177  
Notably, legislation in three of the recipient states—Florida, Kentucky, and North Carolina—
mandates that the state government match corporate contributions to colleges and universities, 
meaning that taxpayers are footing half the bill for BB&T’s agenda.178  
Other gifts seek to change school performance more broadly.  Indeed, this is one area where 
patriotic philanthropy has drawn meaningful critical attention, thanks in part to the high-profile 
work of the Gates Foundation. “[T]he Gates Foundation, with its $3 billion-a-year spend rate that 
is at least four times as big as the next largest philanthropy” is hard to ignore; “[n]ot only does 
what it does make a difference to others in the fields it engages in—it can virtually define the fields 
and set the policy agenda for government as well as philanthropy.”179 One of the Gates initiatives, 
for example, was to break up large public high schools into a series of smaller schools.  On critic 
describes the project as follows:  
From 2000 to 2009, [Gates] spent $2 billion and disrupted 8 percent of the nation’s 
public high schools before acknowledging that his experiment was a flop.  The size 
of a high school proved to have little or no effect on the achievement of its students.  
At the same time, fewer students made it more difficult to field athletic teams.  
Extracurricular activities withered.  And the number of electives offered 
dwindled.180 
It is important to recognize that, while Gates is the biggest player, it is hardly alone in its 
efforts to influence public education.  To take just one other example, the Wallace Foundation 
recently gave a total of $7 million to five states for “school accountability measures,” including 
“train[ing] teachers, principals, and administrators [in public elementary and secondary schools] 
to use accountability data, such as test scores, so that it benefits students in the classroom.”181  
Some of the money was also to be used to support “legislative and regulatory changes aimed at 
ensuring that districts throughout [the recipient] states can develop, prepare and retain leaders 
capable of improving student performance.”182  As a result of the initiative, at least one state 
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enacted a new law that changed statewide principal preparation programs.183  The Wallace 
Foundation also notes, without making claims about causation, that since the beginning of its 
project, fourteen states adopted updated standards for school principals and administrators, more 
than half of the participating states began requiring principal mentoring programs, twelve states 
“enacted laws creating statewide data warehouses, student data management systems and 
‘balanced scorecards,’” and nine states passed new principal evaluation laws.184   
Generalizations become more difficult when we move beyond these recurring categories.  
Some gifts, like the Arnolds’, offer financial support for law enforcement.185  For example, 
Facebook recently paid the $194,000 salary of a local police officer whose job was going to be 
cut.186  Similarly, a recent $2.5 million grant from the New Orleans Convention and Visitors 
Bureau (a consortium of local businesses) allowed the mayor of New Orleans to bring as many as 
60 new State Police troopers into the city.  “Frankly,” said the Bureau’s president, “it’s a gigantic 
paradigm shift in terms of how this city has approached public safety.”187  
Other gifts promote improvements at the other end of the criminal-justice spectrum.  Take two 
recent examples:  In 2008, the Kellogg Foundation gave $1.05 million to a Michigan circuit court 
in order to “reduce alcohol abuse dependency among criminal offenders by expanding the Drug 
Treatment Court Capacity Building Program.”188  And in 2005, the California Endowment donated 
$6.5 million to assist certain California probation departments in “strengthen[ing] the capacity of 
county juvenile justice systems to improve health and mental health services and ensure continuity 
of care as youth transition back to the community.”189 
Community and economic development projects also tend to attract philanthropic gifts.  
Again, Detroit offers a striking example.  Philanthropic organizations have played a leading role 
in the city’s revitalization, in part to compensate for the sorry state of Detroit’s public and private 
sectors during the worst years of recession and bankruptcy.  When the Great Recession hit, Detroit 
was under the leadership of now-disgraced mayor Kwame Kilpatrick.  Kilpatrick resigned in 2008 
after pleading guilty to charges of obstruction of justice; he is currently serving time in federal 
prison after being convicted (along with various members of his administration) of multiple 
corruption offenses.190  Making matters worse, just as the Kilpatrick administration was cratering, 
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the Big Three of the automobile industry—mainstays of Motor City’s private sector—faced their 
own economic crisis.191  Philanthropists stepped in to fill the void, and have been instrumental in 
a variety of significant initiatives, not least of which is the M-1 rail—the country’s first public 
transit system planned by private and philanthropic actors, and funded largely by private money.  
Some of the funding is in the form of investments similar to the P3s described in Part One.  Those 
investments are buttressed by philanthropic donations, including $15 million from the Kresge 
Foundation192 and $4 million from the Ford Foundation.193 
Bloomberg Philanthropies’ “Innovation Teams program” likewise seeks to foster public-
sector improvements at the city level, consistent with Bloomberg’s vision of philanthropy “as a 
way to embolden government.”194 Bloomberg describes the program as follows   
The program helps City Halls drive bold innovation, change culture, and tackle 
big problems to deliver better results for residents. Multi-year grants will be 
awarded to help cities create better results for a range of pressing problems – from 
tackling poverty and neighborhood revitalization to recruiting and retaining public 
employees. . . . Now in the third round of funding, the Innovation Teams program 
allows mayors to fund in-house innovation teams—or “i-teams”—which 
investigate complex local challenges, design solutions with clear goals, and 
rigorously measure progress to better improve citizens’ lives.195  
I-Teams are currently operating in 20 cities, with seven more recently announced.  Each city is 
eligible for up to $500,000 in annual funding for up to three years.196   
Gifts are less common at the federal level than in states and municipalities, in large part 
because the default rule under federal law requires that all gifts go to the general treasury.197  (In 
other words, federal law prohibits donors from earmarking gifts for particular purposes.)  But that 
prohibition is only a default; it can be superseded by more targeted statutes allowing particular 
agencies or actors to receive private gifts.  For example, the Department of Justice has statutory 
authority to receive gifts,198 as does the Federal Communications Commission199 and the Library 
                                                     
191 See, e.g., Caroline Rampell, A ‘Big Three’ Failure and U.S. Auto Making, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2008). 
192 THE KRESGE FOUNDATION, GRANTS AWARDED, http://kresge.org/grant/m-1-rail-0. 
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of Congress.200  And some federal agencies have their own foundations devoted to raising private 
donations; examples include the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, the Food and Drug 
Administration, and the National Air and Space Administration.201 
Even if the federal environment were more conducive to targeted gift-giving, we suspect that 
the majority of gifts would still be aimed at state and local governments.  Not only do state and 
local governments have greater needs for funds (given the restrictions on revenue-raising described 
in the previous Part), but the smaller scale of local government creates more opportunities for gifts 
with meaningful impact.  Perhaps not coincidentally, state and local law on gifts ranges from 
broadly permissive to silent, with only scattered restrictions.202  
III.  THE TROUBLE WITH GIFTS 
Our account thus far has been positive rather than normative: we have sought to explain what 
patriotic philanthropy is and why it happens.  The advantages of gifts should be obvious, and we 
will not belabor them.  Without a doubt, gifts to government can do enormous good.  But gifts are 
not as costless as they first might seem, and the rest of this Article is devoted to exploring their 
downsides.  Our goal is not to condemn patriotic philanthropy; we are by no means abolitionists.  
Rather, our aim is to persuade the reader that gifts are not entirely benign, and in some cases may 
be downright bad.  If we are right about that, it follows that far more attention is due the role of 
private money in the public sphere—including not only philanthropic donations but also for-profit 
investments.  
Our critique of patriotic philanthropy is organized into three sets of objections.  The first two 
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are procedural in nature and democratic in register; we call them the “benevolent dictator 
objection” and the “equality objection,” respectively.  Simply put, gifts to government may 
undermine norms of collective self-government by enabling certain individuals—and not just any 
individuals, but especially wealthy ones—to exert outsized influence on public policy.  The third 
objection focuses on the size and shape of government, highlighting the potential for gifts to create 
a “hollow state,” inflated beyond the capacity of the public fisc and ultimately perilously thin.   
As we will explain, these objections do not apply with the same force to all gifts.  Rather, each 
depends on a set of considerations that will vary from one donation to the next.  And all of the 
objections stem from the idea that gifts matter—that they affect public processes and policies.  
Before outlining the objections, therefore, we begin by exploring the likely impact of gifts, both 
in the short term, as public officials assess offers and contemplate acceptance; and over the longer 
term, as officials make ongoing decisions about budgeting, priority-setting, and programming. 
A.  The Almighty Dollar 
Gifts may create obligations, but they are not obligatory; no one has to accept a gift.  A gift 
begins as an offer, and the intended recipient must decide whether to say thanks or no thanks.  At 
first blush, then, one might imagine that patriotic philanthropy does nothing more than expand the 
range of possibilities available to government, while leaving the basic contours of public 
decisionmaking unchanged.  On that view, the scales weighing the benefits of acceptance against 
the costs of refusal are essentially level—it is just as easy to say thanks as no thanks.  
Public entities do sometimes decline gifts; we discuss one extraordinary example below.  In 
many instances, however, it will be difficult for government to refuse a gift, especially when 
revenue is in short supply.  Gifts look like gifts, and public officials may be hard-pressed to explain 
to their constituents why they have turned down free money. The debacle of the D.C. mayor’s 
mansion is a useful illustration: 
The mayor of D.C. doesn’t have an official residence.  In the early 2000s, then-mayor 
Anthony Williams rented an apartment in Foggy Bottom.203 (According to the Washington Post, 
the current mayor, Muriel Bowser, “shares a duplex wall with Colombian refugees.”204)  To Betty 
Brown Casey, a Maryland philanthropist, this was a travesty; she thought the chief executive of 
the nation’s capital city deserved better digs.  In 2001, without consulting Mayor Williams or any 
other city officials, Casey spent about $16.5 million to purchase a secluded 16.5-acre spread on 
which she would build a mansion for the mayor.  Factoring in the design and construction costs, 
and the creation of an endowment to fund maintenance of the house and property, Casey planned 
to spend upwards of $50 million.  Although Mayor Williams was not terribly excited about the 
gift, he reasoned that it would be “political malpractice” to refuse it.  Prior to Casey’s gift, District 
officials had been contemplating other sites for a possible official residence, and a mayoral 
residence commission had been formed and charged with recommending a site.  But Casey’s gift 
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mooted the commission’s work.  When her chosen property came on the market, she made it clear 
to the city that her money would go to that property, or nothing.  “It was not the mayor’s decision,” 
Casey’s attorney later explained.  “I believe the mayor would have preferred the property be 
located somewhere else in the city, because of the implication that the mayor was moving into a 
tony neighborhood.  Mrs. Casey’s decision, made free from politics, was focused on where was 
the best site.  And it was her belief that it was the last great piece of property in Washington, D.C.”  
D.C. Councilmember Phil Mendelson echoed the sentiment: “The thing that got me was that the 
site she chose was not one that any elected official in the District would have chosen.  It was much 
too isolated.  But the difference for us is that it’s not polite to second-guess a $50 million gift.” 
After accepting Mrs. Casey’s pledge for the D.C. mayor’s house, District officials then went 
through various contortions to make the plan work.  For example, Casey decided that a 4-acre 
swath of largely unkempt federal parkland adjacent to the mansion site should be included as part 
of the mayor’s property.  She proposed trading the parkland for some waterfront land that Casey 
would buy in Georgetown.  The federal Park Service was willing to accept the trade, but a group 
of local residents opposed it; they didn’t buy District officials’ claim that annexing the parkland 
was necessary in order to construct a second entranceway for the new mayoral residence.  “We 
felt the justification that was given was not genuine,” said one community member.  “All of it was 
driven by absolute fear that [Casey’s] impatience would lead her to withdraw,” said another.  The 
mayor did not exactly disagree:  “I think it was the opinion of many people, not just inside 
government but outside, that this extra property wasn’t really necessary,” his spokesman reported.  
Two years passed in rancorous debate over the fate of the parkland.  Finally, in the spring of 
2003, Casey told the Park Service and the District that she would withdraw her gift unless a deal 
was finalized within 60 days.  Scrambling, District officials devised a new plan: The Park Service 
would transfer jurisdiction over the parkland to the city, which would then lease it to the foundation 
that had been created to oversee and maintain the would-be mansion.  The D.C. Council approved 
the transfer in November.  Nevertheless, in mid-December 2003, Casey pulled out of the deal, 
having decided to deed the property to the Salvation Army instead.  “It just consumed a lot of time 
and energy of people at very high pay grades,” said one disgruntled member of the D.C. Council. 
“All these people have better things to do with their time. This thing took on a life of its own.”  
Said another: “She [Casey] has embarrassed the city, she has wasted a lot of people’s time, and 
she has presented the community with development as a fait accompli.”  
The saga of the mayoral residence veers toward satire, but it highlights several features of 
gifts that contribute to their impact on public policy.  To begin with, gifts may be difficult to refuse, 
even when they are for relatively low-priority initiatives. Public officials, no less than the rest of 
us, are familiar with maxims about looking gift horses in the mouth.  As Councilman Mendelson 
put it, “it’s not polite to second-guess” a large gift.  Anxieties about (im)politeness—or “political 
suicide,” in the mayor’s words—likely reflect two overlapping concerns.  First, officials may 
worry about the public-relations consequences of turning down what appears to be free money.  
Particularly at a time when many government units are struggling to make ends meet, news that 
officials have foregone an opportunity to pad the public coffers may not sit well with voters.   
Second, and perhaps more significantly, officials may be concerned about the likely reactions 
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of donors and would-be donors.  In many cases, the proffer of a gift is not an isolated event but 
one moment in an ongoing and potentially beneficial relationship.  Today’s gift, if handled well, 
may produce additional gifts down the road.  Research suggests that “nonprofits have traditionally 
been averse to challenging their foundation funders . . . for fear of losing not only current funders 
but scaring off other foundations.”205  If anything, the incentives are stronger for public officials, 
because the people who are capable of making large donations to government programs also are 
people who are likely to provide other kinds of political support, including campaign contributions 
and independent expenditures.206  The upshot, as journalist Bob Herbert suggested in an opinion 
piece bemoaning private influence on public education, is that “[w]hen a multibillionaire gets an 
idea . . . [about] matters of important public policy and the billionaire is willing to back it up with 
hard cash, public officials tend to reach for the money with one hand and their marching orders 
with the other.”207    
These dynamics not only help explain why governments accept private gifts; they also make 
sense of instances in which gifts are refused.  For example, President Obama reportedly declined 
a jaw-droppingly large gift offered by casino magnate and GOP-booster Sheldon Adelson.  
Adelson’s offer came shortly after Congress had approved additional appropriations for the Iron 
Dome system, a missile defense system funded jointly by the U.S. and Israel and used to protect 
Israel from incoming rockets.  Adelson called Harry Reid, then-Senate Majority Leader, and 
offered to “personally finance $1 billion for Iron Dome batteries, paid through the federal 
government, so committed was he to safeguarding the Jewish state.”208  Reid, in turn, called the 
President to relay the offer.  “Obama was thrown off his guard momentarily—‘What?!’ he asked 
Reid. When the president regained his footing, he told the leader to thank Adelson but that he 
didn’t think private financing of munitions would set a good precedent . . . .”209  
There are, of course, many reasons why the President would decline such an offer, including 
the one suggested in the quote above: private financing of weapons systems is a rather troubling 
prospect.  Yet one wonders if the process would have looked quite the same if the politics were 
different.  Adelson is a multi-billionaire and political “mega-donor”; he has spent record amounts 
on political campaigns.210  None of that, however, has been to the benefit of Obama and his allies.  
On the contrary, Adelson’s record-setting political spending—reportedly in the range of $150 
million dollars211—occurred in the 2012 election cycle, in an effort to unseat President Obama.212  
Obama also had little reason to hope that Adelson would be forthcoming with additional gifts on 
                                                     
205 Cohen, supra note 129. 
206 Goss, supra note 134, at 443 (“Donors also carry the promise of campaign cash, necessary to compete in the 
campaign finance arms race.”). 
207 Herbert, supra note 180. 
208 Glenn Thrush, Obama’s Obama, POLITICO (Jan/Feb 2016). 
209 Id. 
210 Mike Allen, Sheldon Adelson: Inside the mind of the mega-donor, POLITICO (Sept. 23, 2012). 
211 Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Really Spend on Campaign 2012?, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 
2012), available at https://www.propublica.org/article/how-much-did-sheldon-adelson-really-spend-on-campaign-
2012. 
212 Allen, supra note 210. 
 38 
initiatives closer to Obama’s own heart if the Iron Dome offer were accepted.  That’s not to suggest 
that he declined the gift out of spite.  Rather, the point is that the immediate financial costs of 
declining the gift were not, in this case, combined with a complicated and necessarily conjectural 
mix of political considerations.213   
The discussion so far has focused on initial offer and acceptance, but the power of gifts may 
extend well beyond the original bargain.  Once the money is there—or promised—it starts exerting 
a force of its own.  Through some unholy alchemy of political atmospherics and endowment 
effects, losing private funding may seem even worse than refusing a gift to begin with.  Thus, the 
same incentives that push government officials to “reach for the money” may also encourage them 
to hold tightly to funding already secured—even if doing so means compromising other 
objectives.214   
We can see this latter dynamic at play in the story of the D.C. mayor’s mansion, as District 
officials found themselves embroiled in ongoing efforts to save a deal they never really wanted in 
the first place. Two additional examples illustrate different variations on the same theme.   
Consider, first, the controversy over the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo long used by 
the University of North Dakota (UND).  Critics charged that the nickname was a racial stereotype, 
and toward the end of the 1990s efforts began in the North Dakota legislature and at UND to 
eliminate it.  Meanwhile, the University accepted a $100 million gift from wealthy alumnus and 
former hockey player Ralph Engelstad.215  The Engelstad money would pay for the construction 
of a new, eponymous, hockey arena—but it came with a catch.  One of Engelstad's conditions was 
that the University keep the Fighting Sioux name indefinitely. And, to ensure that removal of the 
logo would be inconveniently—if not prohibitively—expensive, he arranged for thousands of 
Fighting Sioux logos to be placed throughout the arena.216   
Matters came to a head in 2000, when University President Charles Kupchella, under pressure 
from various student and faculty groups to eliminate the nickname and logo, formed a Names 
Commission to study the name and suggest future courses of action.  On December 20 of that year, 
Engelstad sent Kupchella a letter expressing his displeasure: 
Dear Chuck:  
I am sorry to have to write this letter, but as a businessman, I have no choice. 
Commitments were made to me by others and yourself, regarding the Sioux logo 
and the Sioux slogan, before I started the arena and after it had been started. 
These promises have not been kept, and I, as a businessman, cannot proceed while 
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this cloud is still hanging above me. . . . 
I understand that you are to make a decision sometime in the future, but I do not 
understand where one person gets the authority to make this kind of a decision on 
behalf of all alumni, students, the city of Grand Forks and the state of North Dakota. 
. . .  
Please be advised that if this logo and slogan are not approved by you no later than 
Friday, December 29, 2000, then you will leave me with no alternative to take the 
action which I think is necessary. 
If the logo and slogan are not approved by the above-mentioned date, I will then 
write a letter on December 30, 2000, to all contractors and to everybody associated 
with the arena, canceling their construction contracts for the completion of the 
arena. . . . It would then be left up to you if you want to complete it, with money 
from wherever you may be able to find it. . . . 
As I am sure you realize, the commitment I made to the university of North Dakota 
was, I believe, one of the 10 largest ever made to a school of higher education, but 
if it is not completed, I am sure it will be the number one building never brought to 
completion at a school of higher education, due to your changing the logo and the 
slogan. . . . 
If I walk away and abandon the project, please be advised that we will shut off all 
temporary heat going to this building, and I am sure that nature, through its cold 
weather, will completely destroy any portion of the building through frost that you 
might be able to salvage. I surely hoped that it would never come to this, but I guess 
it has. . . . 
Please do not consider this letter a threat in any manner, as it is not intended to be. 
It is only notification to you of exactly what I am going to do if you change this 
logo and this slogan. 
In the event it is necessary to cancel the completion of the arena, I will then send 
notification to anyone who is interested, informing them of the same, and laying 
out to them all of the facts and all of the figures from all of the meetings that led 
me to make this decision. . . . 
I might also add that while I was dictating this letter, I received a call from Dean 
Blais (UND’s hockey coach), who is completely fed up, and he informed me that 
he is possibly going to tender his resignation if the logo and the slogan are changed. 
Yours truly,  Ralph Engelstad217  
Engelstad arranged for copies of the letter to be sent to the state Board of Higher Education.  
The next day, the Board voted unanimously to keep the nickname and a newly designed logo, 
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featuring the profile of an American Indian with feathers and war paint.218  But matters were far 
from over.  The controversy continued for another decade and a half before being resolved by a 
statewide voter referendum, and finally—in 2015—a new name.219  
Our final example comes from the other end of the political spectrum, and dates back to the 
early twentieth century.  As the previous section explained, states in the post-Reconstruction South 
struggled to fund their newly established public school systems.  When public money became 
available, it was funneled into schools for White children.220  African-Americans, who had lost the 
right to vote thanks to disenfranchising legislation in most southern states, had little political 
recourse.221  They found support, instead, from the philanthropic sector.  Northern philanthropic 
organizations—most prominently the Rosenwald Fund—devoted substantial resources to 
establishing schools for Black children in the South.  Though private dollars covered the initial 
outlays associated with building schools and getting them up and running, the schools were part 
of the state systems of public education, and the state eventually took over their maintenance.222  
Philanthropy therefore allowed southern African-Americans and their northern allies to achieve a 
result—state support for effective public schools—that would have been all but impossible if 
pursued through conventional political means.  “The ‘gift’ . . . was a Trojan horse, allowing blacks 
to ‘sneak past’ the normal barriers erected to their political influence and use the state itself to help 
achieve their goals.”223 
Together, these examples offer a sense of the gravitational pull that private money can exert 
on public policy.  Not only does the proffer of a gift make the initial policy proposal more 
tempting—whether it is the construction of a mayor’s mansion, a new sports arena, or public 
schools.  Gifts also can shape government behavior going forward, as officials bend to 
accommodate donors’ conditions or to prevent a lucrative deal from falling through.  Importantly, 
those ongoing effects often will spill over into other policy spheres, as gifts draw money and other 
resources toward donor-supported initiatives and away from alternative uses.   
Gifts, it turns out, are not entirely free.  It is the rare gift that doesn’t require some effort and 
expenditure by the government, either at the outset (in the form of matching funds and the like), 
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or down the line when the gift runs out.224  More fundamentally, every gift creates indebtedness, 
which can be leveraged into influence.  Indeed, such influence lies at the very heart of today’s 
“philanthrocapitalism,” which—as described in the previous Part—features donors as hands-on 
supervisors of the projects they fund.  Influence is not necessarily a bad thing, of course; it need 
not be sinister.  But the question remains whether this particular form of influence is good for our 
democracy.  The remainder of this Part takes up that question.   
B. Objections 
1. The Benevolent Dictator Objection 
In a world marked by widespread disagreement about the public good, process matters.  
American democracy is built around the idea that decisions that affect the collective ought to be 
determined by the collective, typically via representatives who are authorized to act on behalf of 
citizens and accountable to those citizens in some meaningful way.  These features of our 
democracy—the need for collective action and for citizens to govern through their 
representatives—make it difficult for any one individual (even an exceptionally wealthy one) to 
prescribe public policy outcomes on her own.  As Part II explained, the consequence is that 
conventional forms of political influence are inefficient from the individual perspective.  From the 
systemic perspective, however, that inefficiency is a feature, not a bug: it is inherent in the notion 
of collective self-government.  
The democratic vision is hard to square with that of a wealthy benefactor who decides, by his 
or her own lights, what is good for public policy, and then uses a targeted donation to purchase 
that policy from government.  We will call this the “benevolent dictator” objection to patriotic 
philanthropy.  Our use of the word “benevolent” is intentional, because gifts will often be used to 
underwrite valuable policies—policies we, as citizens, would endorse.  This objection is not about 
substance, but procedure.  It is about the risk that gifts will circumvent or skew the normal 
processes of democratic decisionmaking. 
Baltimore’s privately financed aerial surveillance program, described in the Introduction, 
illustrates the potential for circumvention.  The Arnolds’ gift allowed the city to forego review by 
the Board of Estimates, which consists of the Mayor, the President of the City Council, the 
Comptroller, the City Solicitor, and the Director of Public Works,225 and which must approve any 
taxpayer-funded financial transactions over $25,000.226  Board of Estimates meetings are open to 
the public, and minutes of the meetings are available online.227  Thus, eschewing the requirement 
of Board approval not only shifted decisionmaking power from the Board to the police 
department—allowing certain officials to make unilateral decisions where collective action is 
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usually required—but also made it possible for the surveillance program to remain secret.  
Even if the formal decisionmaking structures are unchanged (i.e., gifts are run through the 
normal procedures for appropriations), the lure of seemingly free money may skew the way public 
officials view proposals.  As the previous section explained, gifts may be difficult to turn down, 
and donor-supported projects may be difficult to abandon.  At the very least, policy proposals that 
come with their own readymade funding sources—requiring reduced or delayed public outlays—
will be more attractive to policymakers than initiatives that must be fully funded from the public 
fisc.  And, going forward, sunk costs and reliance interests are likely to bias public decisionmaking 
in favor of maintaining programs already in effect—even if the private money runs out.  
These points are well-known in the literature on intergovernmental grants, described in Part 
I.228  But such grants are different from private gifts in at least one critical respect.  To the extent 
that federal grants skew state policy or spending (for example), the influence does not come from 
outside the political process—state voters are federal voters, too.229  Intergovernmental grants 
move agenda-setting authority from one government unit to another.  Gifts, by contrast, outsource 
agenda-setting to private actors. 
As is true of the other objections described in this Part, the weight of the benevolent-dictator 
objection will vary with context.  First, it matters how much influence the donor exercises over 
policy- and agenda-setting.  The objection is muted, for example, when gifts are solicited by 
government to support government-initiated programs rather than offered up by donors to support 
their own ideas about the public good.230  Competitive grants, like Bloomberg Philanthropies’ 
Innovation Team program and Mayors’ Challenge, may be less worrisome in this regard.231  
Recipient cities define their own priorities and articulate their own plans; the funders decide which 
plans are most deserving.  To be sure, such funding decisions are contestable and value-laden—
the philanthropic role is by no means neutral—but the power of agenda-setting remains with the 
public sector.   
Relatedly, gifts may be more or less specific, and the benevolent-dictator objection more or 
less strong as a result.  The donor who gives a large gift to a school district’s local education fund 
is affecting public education—her gift has a direct impact on the level of funding available for a 
particular school district—but decisions about how to allocate the funds will still be made in the 
conventional manner.  The donor who earmarks her gift for a particular type of programming, by 
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contrast, is playing a far more active role in educational policy-setting. 
Finally, it matters a great deal what sort of procedures are used to assess gifts.  Circumvention 
is different from skew, and not all gifts will hold the same attractive power.  In some cases, 
moreover, gifts may change the decisionmaking process—transferring control from one body to 
another, for example—in ways that seem worthy of celebration rather than concern.  
Once again, Detroit offers a useful illustration.  The philanthropic interventions into Detroit’s 
governance described in previous Parts—the M-1 rail and the Grand Bargain to save the Arts 
Institute—are small fry compared to the Detroit Future City Strategic Framework.  As the name 
suggests, the Framework is a comprehensive blueprint for “[t]ransforming the [c]ity and its 
[n]eighborhoods,” focusing on areas of “economic growth,” “land use,” “city systems,” 
“neighborhoods,” “land and building assets,” and “civic capacity.”232  The project was launched 
in the wake of Mayor Dave Bing’s ill-fated plan to shrink Detroit by one third, moving homes and 
businesses from sparsely populated parts of the city to higher-density neighborhoods so as to 
streamline service delivery.233  (Bing was the successor to Kwame Kilpatrick.)  Not surprisingly, 
the Mayor’s plan met with “roaring public backlash,”234 both on substance and in reaction to the 
opaque and seemingly top-down nature of the planning process.  The Future City project emerged 
as an alternative, and though its long-term steering committee initially was formed by Mayor Bing, 
it is now managed by the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation, a non-profit supported by private 
donations.  Philanthropists played a significant role in spearheading the Future City initiative, as 
well as funding it.235 The Kresge Foundation alone pledged $150 million to support the 
Framework,236 and six other philanthropies—Ford Foundation, W.K. Kellogg Foundation, John S. 
and James L. Knight Foundation, Hudson Webber Foundation and the Community Foundation for 
Southeast Michigan—have been intimately involved in both planning and funding.237   
The Future City initiative moved the city-planning conversation outside of City Hall, 
deemphasizing the role of elected officials in favor of “technical” and “community” experts.238 
                                                     
232 https://detroitfuturecity.com/framework/.   
233 See David Sands, Kresge Foundation Pledges $150 Million To Implement Detroit Future City Framework, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2013), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/09/kresge-foundation-150-
million-detroit-future-city_n_2440887.html; see also Anna Clark, Detroit Works’ Long-Term Strategic Vision for 
Motor City, ARCHITECT MAGAZINE (Nov. 27, 2012) (“The project’s initial launch was inept and acrimonious, with 
Mayor Bing telling a reporter, “We will depopulate some neighborhoods.” The comment confirmed residents’ fears 
that the real plan was to force them out of their homes.”). 
234 Anna Clark, Dave Bing’s Detroit, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 2, 2013), available at 
http://prospect.org/article/dave-bing’s-detroit. 
235 See Clark, supra note __ (noting that the planning process was “resuscitated largely because of the efforts of the 
Kresge Foundation”); Bill McGraw, Redesigning Detroit: Mayor Mike Duggan’s blueprint unveiled, BRIDGE 
MAGAZINE (Aug. 18, 2015), available at 
http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2015/08/redesigning_detroit_the_mayors.html (describing Kresge’s 
role in Future City). 
236 See Sands, supra note 233.  
237 See Mathew Dolan, Revival Bid Pits Detroit vs. Donor, WALL ST. JOURNAL (July 2, 2011) (reporting that 
foundations “are now on track to spend more than $1 billion over seven years on a range of urban-renewal projects”). 
238 https://detroitfuturecity.com/framework/ 
 44 
Yet the resulting process was, if anything, more inclusive than the Mayor’s initial plan would have 
been.  The Framework, in the words of its stewards, “is grounded in robust community engagement 
that included hundreds of meetings and 30,000 conversations and 163,000 touchpoints and . . . 
more than 70,000 surveyed responses and comments from participants.”239  Reasonable minds may 
differ on whether the normative criteria for public policymaking should focus on the level of 
citizen participation and engagement, or on the presence or absence of formal democratic 
structures of accountability and authorization, such as elections.  One thing is clear, however: 
Kresge and the other foundations are not simply handing over their money to fill the coffers of the 
Detroit city government; they are changing the city’s governance in important ways.  The results 
may well be desirable; they may even be “democratic.”  But the argument for democratic 
legitimacy must grapple with difficult questions concerning the “privatization of political 
representation,” including whether and under what circumstances philanthropists, nonprofits, and 
other private policy entrepreneurs can function effectively as “nonelected [community] 
representatives.”240 
2.  The Equality Objection 
A second objection to patriotic philanthropy sounds in equality.  To the extent that gifts shape 
government policy, donors are able to exert a form of influence that is not available to all, or even 
most, citizens.  In this sense, gifts—like other forms of financial influence—undermine norms of 
equal political citizenship.241   
The equality objection builds on the concerns sketched above. One might object to a 
benevolent dictator chosen at random.  One might object more to a benevolent dictator chosen 
according to wealth.  In the latter case, one might worry not only about inequality of inputs—
because most citizens will not be eligible to play this role—but also about inequality of outputs.  
Wealthy benefactors might use gifts to support policies that benefit everyone equally or that focus 
on the needs of the less fortunate, but then again they might not.  Instead, private donations might 
focus on initiatives that serve the interests of the donors themselves—e.g., more amenities for tony 
neighborhoods.242   
Redistributive concerns are central, for example, in debates over private funding for public 
                                                     
239 https://detroitfuturecity.com/framework/framework-faq/; see also David Sands, Detroit Works Longterm Planning 
Calls On Residents To Help Shape Strategic Plan, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/04/detroit-works-longterm-planning_n_1401448.html (describing plans for 
“community conversations”). 
240 Jeremy Levine, The Privatization of Political Representation: Community-Based Organizations as Nonelected 
Neighborhood Representatives (unpublished ms on file with authors). 
241 Cf. ZELENAK, supra note 36, at 19 (noting that “[t]he widespread [tax] filing requirement promotes the goal of 
political equality (under which ‘all individuals . . . have access to the political process’ and ‘large disparities in political 
influence are disfavored’), by recognizing and formalizing the status of each tax return filer as a taxpayer---whether 
her tax liability happens to be $1 or $1 million” (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1567 (1988)). 
242 Private donations for public parks are one example.  See, e.g., Gazley, supra note 150 (“A wealthy donor is more 
likely to support the park in her neighborhood than she is the pocket park across town.”); Kleiman, supra note 160 
(“Donors tend to support parks in high-profile locations.”). 
 45 
school systems.  Most states (many of them prompted by litigation) have taken pains to equalize 
funding for public schools statewide, so that property-rich districts do not enjoy vastly better 
schools than districts in poorer neighborhoods.243  In some states, state-level funding caps preclude 
municipalities from raising their own taxes so as to increase the public resources available to local 
schools.244  Yet the same states permit local school districts to accept unlimited voluntary private 
donations.245  Meanwhile, as one would expect, the available evidence suggests that private 
donations to public schools tend to be concentrated in wealthy districts—thereby exacerbating the 
inequalities that equalization litigation and legislation seek to address.246   
Again, concerns about equality will not apply uniformly to all gifts.  Consider, first, concerns 
about equality of inputs.  Such concerns turn, at least in part, on the size and source of the relevant 
gift.  A huge gift from a single donor, such as Sheldon Adelson’s proposal to spend $1 billion in 
support of the Iron Dome, provokes a unique set of anxieties.  Indeed, one reason why gifts of 
money might be particularly worrisome—more so, that is, than in-kind gifts of labor and the like—
is that it is possible for one person to accumulate far more money than, say, spare time.  Sheldon 
Adelson has finite time and energy.  His $21 billion fortune technically is finite too, but its 
enormity allows him to make waves that the rest of us could not possibly match, even if we pooled 
our resources.  
Contrast a series of small gifts from diverse sources—something like a crowdsourcing 
approach to patriotic philanthropy.  There are good reasons to doubt that collective private 
financing of public goods will materialize repeatedly or reliably,247 but broad-based donations do 
happen from time to time.  For example, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many taxpayers 
                                                     
243 Property taxes account for 81% of local funding for public education, or 37% of total funding (when state and 
federal funds are added to the mix).  U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Center Educ. Statistics, Table 235.10, DIG. EDUC. STAT. 
(August 2015), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_235.20.asp?current=yes.  States have been 
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Id. at 355, 367.   
244 See Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting parents’ challenge to state law prohibiting 
localities from increasing their tax contributions to local schools above a statewide cap). 
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(forthcoming 2017) (ms. at 28 & Tbl. 1) (canvassing state legislation on private funding for public education and 
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state-level legislation addressing how private donations. . . might implicate fair funding”). 
246 See Nelson & Gazley, supra note 172, at [ms. at 25] (finding “no evidence that voluntary contributions offset 
reductions in the public financing of public schools” but rather that “voluntary contributions . . . serve to enhance 
spending in school districts that already receive significantly larger per-pupil revenues”); Reich Equality, supra note 
14, at 27 (studying California LEFs and finding that “[s]uburban schools enjoy a massive fund raising advantage over 
urban schools, and the top performing suburban districts in private fund raising have an exponential advantage”); Rob 
Reich Not Very Giving, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), at A25 (“Private giving to public schools widens the gap between 
rich and poor.  It exacerbates inequalities in funding.”).  
247 See, e.g., Ian Ayers, Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of Social-Contracting Voting Mechanisms 
(unpublished ms. on file with authors, at 3) (describing how free-riding can impede collective private financing for 
public goods, and various mechanisms scholars have proposed as curatives (citing sources)). 
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sent small gifts to the federal government intended to support the war effort. One letter read, “[w]e 
feel [this money] is now needed to fight the enemy that has ruthlessly taken mothers, fathers and 
children from us. Use the money wisely in this difficult endeavor and let’s send a clear message 
to those who seek to take away our freedom: We are one Nation under God. You can destroy our 
buildings but you will never destroy our spirit! Semper Fidelis!”248  In another case, people from 
all over the country sent modest donations to help defray the costs of prosecuting Susan Smith for 
the murder of her two young sons after media reports suggested that the relevant county might not 
be able to afford a death penalty prosecution.249  Such gifts may be problematic for various reasons, 
but inequality of inputs is unlikely to rank high on that list. 
As for equality of outputs, concerns will turn, first and foremost, on the redistributive impacts 
of gifts.  Research on philanthropic giving suggests that a relatively small segment of private 
donations is redistributive in purpose or effect.250  That research is not focused on gifts to 
government, however, and it’s possible that patriotic philanthropy will—on the whole—tend to be 
more redistributive than philanthropy directed at private causes.  If nothing else, gifts to 
government will not be dominated by donations to religion, which account for the overwhelming 
majority of charitable gifts by individuals and drive down the percentage of such gifts that register 
as redistributive.251  And, perhaps, patriotic philanthropy will tend to be more widely beneficial 
simply by virtue of supporting public programs.  Even if sited in an exclusive neighborhood, for 
example, a public park is still open to the public.   
Somewhat less obviously, the force of the equality objection also might depend on the link 
between a given gift and the donor’s own self-interest.  Some theorists question whether any giving 
is truly altruistic, or whether all philanthropy can be explained by the benefits—the “warm glow,” 
for example—it imparts to donors.252  We have something more prosaic in mind here.  Some gifts 
benefit donors in immediate, tangible ways.  For example, in July 2008, the Cherokee Nation 
announced that it was donating millions of dollars to help fund a highway expansion project just 
                                                     
248 Brendan Minter, To Uncle Sam With Love, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Apr. 15, 2002), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122694694812234207. 
249 Rebecca A. Pinto, Note, The Public Interest and Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1343, 1346 n.11 (1999). 
250 See, e.g., Reich Equality, supra note 14, at 18-19 (expressing skepticism about the redistributive impacts of 
philanthropic giving by individuals and foundations, and citing studies); Julian Wolpert, The Redistributional Effects 
of America’s Private Foundations, in PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS AND LEGITIMACY: U.S. AND EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVES (Kenneth Prewitt et al., eds. 2005) (concluding that foundation giving is, at best, “modestly 
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251 Reich Equality, supra note 14, at 17-18. 
252 See, e.g., James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 
ECON. J. 464 (1990). 
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outside of Tulsa, Oklahoma.253 The project, which broke ground the next summer,254 aimed to 
reduce rush-hour gridlock on the portion of Interstate 44 that passes through the Tulsa suburb of 
Catoosa.255 Perhaps not coincidentally, when the tribe announced the donation, it was in the midst 
of a major, $150 million expansion of Cherokee Nation Entertainment’s newly branded Hard Rock 
Hotel and Casino, which was located along the very stretch of interstate to be improved.256 The 
tribe’s donations ultimately accounted for nearly $12 million of the $45 million price tag, and 
appeared to have played a significant role in getting the project underway.257  The director of the 
Oklahoma Department of Transportation later told reporters that “[t]his project, I can assure you, 
would [otherwise] have been put way on the back burner because we could never gather enough 
money to do the project to get it done.”258  
Such gifts might trigger a particular kind of equality objection—a sense that it is unfair for 
well-heeled individuals or groups to leverage public policy, or public facilities, for personal gain.  
Gifts that come with naming rights—such as Ralph Engelstad’s financing for the UND hockey 
arena colloquially known as “the Ralph”259—might raise a more modest variation on that theme, 
whereas gifts like the Rosenwald Fund’s donations to support Black schoolchildren in the South 
would seem largely unobjectionable from the equality perspective.260   
3. The Hollow State Objection 
Students of philanthropy long have struggled to identify the relationship between philanthropy 
and the state.  On one view, philanthropy competes with the state in the provision of public goods; 
at the extreme, it replaces the state.261  For those who think that the private and non-profit sectors 
are likely to be more effective than government, that is a happy result.  For others, it suggests both 
an abdication of the government’s obligations to its citizens and a worrisome shift away from 
democratic principles.262  From the latter perspective, gifts to government may seem like a move 
in the right direction.  Gifts expand the capacity of government; they enable government to 
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discharge its various obligations.   
There are at least two problems with this perspective on gifts.  The first is the obvious 
objection to big government: Expanding the reach of government is not necessarily a good thing.  
If there is not political will to pay for a given initiative out of public funds—to do it the hard way, 
as it were—perhaps it should not be done at all.  This objection might have particular force in 
states and localities that have adopted legal restrictions on taxes and debt.  Such restrictions are a 
sort of Ulysses pact, a way of tying government to the mast so that it cannot (without significant 
difficulty, at least) succumb to the temptation of attractive but costly policies.  But they are also 
limitations on the size of government263—limitations that gifts evade.  
The big-government objection is worthy of attention, but we’re more interested in the other 
side of the coin:  Gifts may shrink the state in the long term by hiding the government’s 
inadequacies and/or reducing the public’s appetite for taxes.  To see the problem, it helps to 
consider patriotic philanthropy in comparison to more conventional forms of private philanthropy.  
Philanthropy’s critics worry that citizens will be less willing to fund valuable redistributive policies 
as taxpayers if they get used to the idea that the social safety net will be propped up by private 
donors.  A related critique is that private philanthropy absolves government of responsibility for 
needed services.264  At first blush, those arguments might seem inapplicable to gifts to government, 
because the government still is providing the service in question.  Yet, depending on the particular 
arrangement, the government’s role may be nominal at best.  That is, services that appear to be 
publicly funded and delivered may in fact be handled primarily by the philanthropic sector.   
The upshot is something of a Catch-22 for patriotic philanthropy.  If the private role is 
transparent, it triggers familiar concerns about philanthropy supplanting the role of the state.265  
But if the private role is hidden from view, a different set of worries comes to the fore.  Citizens 
might believe that public monies are sufficient to cover services that, in fact, government lacks 
capacity to provide.  And the delusion that government is capable of paying for the various public 
goods it appears to supply might, in turn, affect citizens’ perceptions of taxes and their preferences 
for public policy.  Some citizens might think (mistakenly) that government is doing too much and 
want to roll back programs or reduce taxes.  Others, buoyed by an inflated sense of the buying 
power of their taxes, may push for public services that they would not support if they knew the 
real cost.   
As this discussion suggests, the “hollow state” objection turns, in large part, on the visibility 
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and transparency of gifts to government.266  Transparency is not a panacea—it creates its own 
problems of perception, described above—but at least it is honest.  If government cannot muster 
public funds to pay for public policy, we think citizens should know about it.  And, perhaps, the 
public should feel it.  It least in some circumstances, it might be useful for the people to experience 
the consequences of inadequate public resources—to live with that crack in the Washington 
Monument, for example—so that we can decide, collectively, whether the problem is worth 
solving.  Gifts allow us to avoid those unpleasant consequences in the short term.267  But, like 
using a Band-Aid to cover a serious wound, we should recognize that resorting to a temporary fix 
could make things worse in the long term.268 
The force of the objection also depends on the scale of private giving.  A few gifts here and 
there are unlikely to bias public perceptions about the capacity of government, or to cause 
government to develop a dependency on private largesse.  Though it is difficult to specify the scale 
of patriotic philanthropy today, it is unlikely that private giving currently is voluminous enough to 
pose a clear and present danger to government capacity.   
Nevertheless, we think it would be a mistake to ignore the risks sketched here.  As Part II 
explained, there is good reason to believe that gifts to government will continue to expand.  Perhaps 
more importantly, gifts are only one way that private entities finance the modern state.  Most 
private financing for government (including the P3 arrangements described in Part I) takes the 
form of for-profit investment, and such investments also appear to be proliferating.269  Gifts and 
investments differ in various ways, but they share a common core: both reflect—and reinforce—
the notion that public revenues are insufficient to satisfy the public’s needs. 
Zooming out still further, gifts must be considered alongside broader trends toward 
privatization.  Government increasingly outsources public work, relying on private contractors to 
perform jobs and deliver services that would otherwise be accomplished by government 
employees.  There is a vast literature on privatization, much of it critical.  But that literature rarely 
acknowledges the link between private performance of government functions and private 
financing of those same functions—whether via gifts or public-private partnerships and other 
forms of investment.  Although gifts and partnerships sound nice, the environment, considered as 
a whole, raises fundamental questions about the nature of government.  If private actors are 
financing government programs, and private actors are then doing the work to advance those 
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programs, one wonders what—exactly—is left of the state.  
C. Implications   
American representative democracy envisions a government elected by the people that sets 
public priorities in the public interest. That vision assumes a working electoral process where 
political participation is consequential, for it is ratification through the political process that 
legitimates policy outputs as public outputs.  Not surprisingly, therefore, commentators and 
policymakers have paid close attention to laws and practices that undermine or unbalance political 
participation.  Scholars have focused, for example, on laws that deprive individuals of the right to 
vote, that configure electoral structures so as to minimize the effects of political participation, or 
that facilitate political entrenchment and the like.   
In short, the lesson of modern democratic theory is that the democratic process matters.  
Obsessing over it is not fetishizing, but reflects the conviction that a robust political process is the 
best way of ensuring that decisions about public policy are made in the interest of the public.  A 
well-functioning electoral process is, in this sense, a fundamental aspect of individual liberty.270  
Consider in this vein the debate about constitutionality of laws regulating campaign financing, 
which generally has focused on whether elected officials are capable of acting in the public interest 
when they depend upon private funders to finance their campaigns. One side of the debate is 
animated by the central concern that private campaign financing distorts or corrupts public 
priorities by inducing political candidates to deliver goods to private interests in exchange for 
much-needed campaign support.271  Instead of being dependent upon the people and working to 
advance the public interest, public officials become dependent upon private funders and pursue 
sectional interests.272  The other side of the debate is concerned with the fact that contributions, 
expenditures, and lobbying are necessary devices for getting one’s preferences ratified through the 
political process.  Thus, both sides of the campaign finance debate understand the importance of 
the political process to legitimating democratic outcomes.  Both sides are making arguments about 
the distortion of public policy—those in favor of campaign finance reform argue that private 
money induces political actors to bend policy away from the public interest and in favor of private 
interests, while those in favor of private money argue that it is impossible for government to act in 
the public interest if members of the public cannot spend money to inform political actors of their 
preferences.  
Similar considerations animate laws governing gifts to government officials.  Federal and state 
law prohibit most such gifts.  Gifts from private entities are subject to gift bans, which vary in 
stringency from one jurisdiction to the next; some states, for example, have zero-tolerance or “no 
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cup of coffee” rules regarding gifts.273  Meanwhile, gifts from public entities may run into 
limitations such as those in the Constitution’s Emoluments Clause, which prohibits federal officers 
from accepting “present[s]” or “[e]molument[s]” “from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”274   
The purpose of gift bans is not difficult to discern.  Like the prohibitions on bribery described 
in Part II, restrictions on gifts protect the integrity of the democratic process.  Such restrictions, 
together with other rules policing conflicts of interest, “reflect a commitment to a government that 
operates in the interests of the general public, as defined by independent and impartial officials, 
rather than in the interests of private persons, or at the direction of persons with private benefit or 
gain in mind.”275 
Patriotic philanthropy triggers similar anxieties about private giving distorting public 
priorities.  Gifts to government are not covered by regulations on gifts to government officials; 
public officials do not get to deposit patriotic philanthropists’ checks in their personal accounts.  
Nevertheless, as we have sought to show in this Part, donations targeted at particular initiatives 
may at best bias public decisionmaking in favor of those initiatives, and at worst allow particular 
government officials to circumvent the normal processes of collective deliberation.    
What this suggests is that our current debates about campaign finance, conflicts of interest, 
and the like, are too narrow: They are missing an analogous, and arguably even more subversive, 
threat to the political process.  That threat is not necessarily limited to outright gifts, but extends 
to other forms of private financing for public programs.   
Thinking about private financing as a form of influence, in turn, suggests a still deeper point 
about democratic theory.  Modern democratic theory and practice tend to assume that the 
government will be financed by “public” money, such as the taxes, fees, and intergovernmental 
grants described in Part I.276  But, as we have seen in the examples throughout that Article, that 
assumption is belied by the fiscal realities of the modern state.   
The increasingly common refrain that government needs help from the private and 
philanthropic sectors in order to satisfy its obligations to the public hints at a gaping hole in existing 
theory.  We, as a society, lack a coherent account of the relationship between how the government 
is financed and the government’s legitimacy.  Does it matter for the legitimacy of representative 
democracy that the government is broadly financed by its citizens?  Is “public” financing like 
voting, which modern democratic theory expects—both as a matter of the citizen’s standing and 
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as a matter of the legitimacy of the state—will be exercised by the vast majority of the state’s 
citizens?  What does it mean for political citizenship if our public priorities are financed by small 
group of well-off and well-meaning oligarchs?277  The answers to those questions lie well outside 
the scope of this project, but we hope the discussion in this Part has suggested some of the reasons 
why they might matter.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered both a positive and a normative account of gifts to government, 
showing where and why such gifts happen, and why they might be cause for concern.  Our critique 
of patriotic philanthropy should not be understood as outright condemnation; we do not deny the 
value of private giving for the public good.  Nevertheless, we have sought to highlight the risks of 
a phenomenon that—thus far—appears to have been ignored, applauded, or simply shrugged off.  
Although patriotic philanthropy is important in its own right, we also have emphasized that 
gifts to government must be understood as part of a larger ecosystem of public-private 
convergence.  Gifts operate alongside other means of private influence over the public policy, and 
other forms of private financing of government, including for-profit investment.  And private 
financing often is combined with more conventional modes of privatization, such as outsourcing 
government functions to private actors.  Even a glimpse at this ecosystem suggests the need for far 
more research, and theorizing, about the line between public and private and the contours of the 
modern state.  
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